

The U.S. Corvette *Madison* **A Design & Operational History**

by Gary M. Gibson

*“A beautiful corvette-built ship”*¹

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Introduction

In the fall of 1812, the United States laid down the 24-gun corvette *Madison* at Sackets Harbor, New York. It was the first warship built at that location but not the last. Launched in only 45 days from laying the keel, it was the largest warship yet built on Lake Ontario and it served from the spring of 1813 to the end of the war and beyond. From April to July 1813 it was the flagship of the American squadron on Lake Ontario until superseded by the larger frigate *General Pike*. The *Madison* was second only to the brig *Oneida* in the number of naval actions it fought with the British during the War of 1812.²


Origin

When the United States declared war against Great Britain on 18 June 1812, the total American naval force on Lake Ontario was one brig, the *Oneida*, commanded by Lieutenant Melancthon Taylor Woolsey. Launched in 1809, the *Oneida* was armed with 18, 24-pound carronades and was based at Sackets Harbor, New York.

Opposing the *Oneida* on Lake Ontario was the British Provincial Marine. This organization was not a part of the Royal Navy but was a branch of the British Army's Quartermaster-General's Department. In the summer of 1812, the Provincial Marine had four warships on Lake Ontario: the 20-gun *Royal George*, the 14-gun *Earl of Moira*, and two smaller schooners, the *Duke of Gloucester* and *Prince Regent*. The *Oneida* was outnumbered and outgunned. Woolsey believed that the *Oneida* alone was not adequate to contest the Provincial Marine for control of the lake.

Brigadier General William Hull's unexpected surrender at Detroit in August 1812 made it clear to the Madison administration in Washington that for the war to be successful the United States must obtain and maintain naval superiority on the Great Lakes. This led to the appointment of 40-year old Captain Isaac Chauncey, then commandant of the New York Navy Yard, as commodore and commander-in-chief of all American naval forces on the Great Lakes.³

Chauncey, however, knew little about the conditions on Lake Ontario and almost nothing about the resources available at Sackets Harbor. Neither he nor anyone else at the New York Navy Yard had ever been near the place. However, Chauncey had been involved with the arrangements to build the *Oneida* so he was familiar with Woolsey and his general situation.



Isaac Chauncey

Now in charge, Chauncey realized that he would have to accomplish the president's goal of controlling Lake Ontario in 1812 with the forces at hand – the *Oneida* augmented by arming an unknown number of small former merchant schooners of equally unknown quality. As Woolsey had kept the Navy Department informed of the nature of the force opposing him on the lake (and unfortunately over-estimating that force) Chauncey knew his prospects were not good. He needed more force and he needed it as soon as possible.

Isaac Chauncey decided that the fastest way to augment his naval force on Lake Ontario was to build another brig similar to but larger than the *Oneida*. With that in mind he

engaged New York City shipwright Henry Eckford to build her and dispatched him and a number of workmen to Sackets Harbor.⁴ Although the complete dimensions of the proposed brig are not known, her deck was to be 110 feet long and Chauncey ordered 22, 32-pound carronades to be shipped from New York City to Sackets Harbor to arm her.⁵ This would slightly exceed the reported force of the Provincial Marine's *Royal George*. In addition, the mast and spar dimensions for the proposed brig, which are known, matched those used by vessels in the Royal Navy mounting 20 or 22 guns.⁶ Chauncey ordered Master Commandant Charles Ludlow, who replaced Chauncey as commandant of the New York Navy Yard in September 1812, to have the sails and rigging for a warship of that size made at New York and shipped to Sackets Harbor as fast as possible.⁷

Both Chauncey and Eckford realized that there was no chance the new brig would be ready for service in 1812. It would take at least two months to build and launch her. Afterwards a few weeks would be needed to complete her interior, install her masts and rigging, arm and provision her for service and provide a crew. Weather conditions on Lake Ontario after mid-November would make this at first difficult then, after the harbor iced over, impossible until spring. For the rest of 1812 Commodore Chauncey would have to make do with the *Oneida* and the former merchant schooners.

Design

When Henry Eckford arrived at Sackets Harbor, he changed the new warship's design. Instead of a brig he was going to build a larger ship-rigged (three-masted) vessel. It is not known when this change was approved by Commodore Chauncey, but he reported the change to Secretary Hamilton shortly after he arrived at Sackets Harbor on 6 October.⁸ In addition, Chauncey's letter to Charles Ludlow at the New York Navy Yard in late October requested that the anchors, cables and other equipment previously ordered for a brig conform to the new design. This strongly suggests that Eckford's new design had Chauncey's approbation shortly after Eckford decided upon it, perhaps even before Chauncey left New York City.⁹

Pierced for 13 guns a side, the new ship "of the same class of the *John Adams*," would have a 112-foot keel, a beam of 32½ feet, a depth of hold of 11½ feet and be of 580 tons burthen.¹⁰ She would be about 125 feet long on deck with space for 24, 32-pound carronades and two long nine pound cannon, four more guns than previously planned and a force now clearly superior to the Provincial Marine's *Royal George*.¹¹

The ship would be about the same size as the old salt-water 32-gun frigate (former merchant vessel) *George Washington* or the 27-gun *Adams* as rebuilt in 1812, though mounting fewer (but more powerful) guns than either.¹²

	New Ship	<i>Royal George</i> ¹³
Keel	110 feet	82 feet
Length on deck	about 125 feet ¹⁴	96 feet nine inches
Beam	32 feet six inches	27 feet seven inches
Tons burthen	580 (612) ¹⁵	330
Armament	24, 32-pound carronades	20, 32-pound


	New Ship	<i>Royal George</i>¹³
	2, 9 pound cannon	carronades
Broadside	393 pounds	320 pounds

Table 1 - New ship vs. *Royal George*

	<i>Oneida</i>¹⁶	<i>Earl of Moira</i>¹⁷
Keel	77 feet six inches	56 feet four inches
Length on deck	85 feet six inches	70 feet six inches
Beam	23 feet	23 feet eight inches
Tons burthen	216	169
Armament	18, 24-pound carronades	10, 18-pound carronades
Broadside	162 pounds	90 pounds

Table 2 – *Oneida* vs. *Earl of Moira*

If circumstances allowed for a fleet action between the two forces on Lake Ontario, the plan was to have the new ship oppose the *Royal George* while the *Oneida* took on the *Earl of Moira*. The American armed schooners would then collectively engage and defeat the British schooners *Duke of Gloucester* and *Prince Regent*. Tables 1 and 2 show how the two pairs of major combatants would match up.



Henry Eckford's 1819 design for a 24-gun corvette with dimensions similar to those of *Madison*.
From Chapelle, *History of the American Sailing Navy*, p.341.

Of course any such fleet action under this plan would have to wait until 1813. The immediate task was to complete the new ship in time for it to be ready to participate.

Construction

When Henry Eckford and his workmen arrived at Sackets Harbor in September 1812, their first task was to complete refitting and arming the small merchant schooners just purchased from their owners by Commodore Chauncey and Lieutenant Woolsey. By mid-October six schooners were ready and a further three were lacking only their armament which was on its way.¹⁸ Chauncey had dispatched Lieutenant Woolsey to Oswego to hasten their arrival.

With Chauncey's squadron now about as strong as it could be in 1812, Eckford and his men turned their full attention to building the new ship. The first task, collecting the

timber needed to begin construction, began about the first of October. It took two weeks before enough timber was ready to allow the ship's keel to be laid.¹⁹ After that, progress was rapid.

Among the men in Eckford's crew was 28 year old shipwright Henry Eagle. Eagle, a native of Prussia, had been employed by Henry Eckford at his ship yard at New York before going to Oswego with him in 1808 to build the *Oneida*.²⁰ He then remained at Oswego to build the merchant schooners *Diana* (1809), *America* (1810) and *Julia* (1811) for local merchant Matthew McNair. Arguably the most experienced shipwright on the lake, he was quickly rehired by Eckford and moved to Sackets Harbor in September 1812 to oversee building the *Madison*.

From the operational record it appears that Henry Eckford built the ship slightly smaller than what Chauncey reported to the Navy Department when the ship was launched. Later Chauncey reported the ship as being of 593 tons burthen. However, calculating tonnage using the 1812 dimensions and the American "Builder's Old Measurement" formula, yields a tonnage value of 623.²¹ However, in June 1813 a report from Isaac Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy William Jones gave a tonnage value of 593.²² This is a difference of 30 tons, the size of one of the small merchant sloops on the lake and not easy to explain. This could be accounted for if Eckford had built the ship with a beam one foot three inches shorter. Given the still very basic shipbuilding conditions at Sackets Harbor this could easily happen and as there were no reported difficulties with the ship accommodating its armament, the Navy Department had no cause for complaint. The new dimensions of the ship would then be

Keel for tonnage	112 feet
Extreme beam	31 feet three inches

In early November Chauncey reported that the new ship "will be launched in about three weeks" and he recommended a name for the new ship. He told Secretary Hamilton that "I should like that *Madison* should oppose the *Royal George* and *Prince Regent*."²³

Chauncey also asked Hamilton for an officer to command the new ship:

*It will be proper to have a commander for the ship as soon as possible. She will be one of the best commands for a Master Commandant in the service.*²⁴

Secretary Hamilton replied on 19 November telling Chauncey that he approved of the name *Madison*. Furthermore, he had ordered Master Commandant James T. Leonard and Purser Henry Fry to Sackets Harbor to take charge of the *Madison*.



James T. Leonard

In the Royal Navy, a ship the size of the *Madison* was a post for a captain (a so-called "post ship") and this was generally the case even in the United States Navy – on the Atlantic. There a Master Commandant's command was generally a brig or a ship-sloop mounting from 14 to 20 guns. It was a different matter on the lakes. Service there was, in 1812, seen as secondary in scale to that on the Atlantic and officers were assigned accordingly.

Henry Fry's purser's commission was brand-new but Leonard was an experienced officer.²⁵ He received his midshipman's warrant in 1799, became an acting lieutenant in 1802, was commissioned lieutenant in 1807 and master commandant in July 1812. He had served on board the frigates *President* and *Constellation*, the sloop *Hornet*, the bomb ketch *Vesuvius*, served as temporary commandant at New Orleans and, shortly before his last promotion, was ordered to New York City with a flotilla of gunboats.

It was this last assignment that brought Leonard and Chauncey into conflict with each other for the first time. Unwisely, then-Lieutenant Leonard sailed his gunboat flotilla into New York harbor flying a broad pendant. One look was all it took for Chauncey, the senior officer present, to complain to Secretary Hamilton that there appeared to be a "misconception." He understood Leonard to be under his orders with no right to fly a broad pendant. As Chauncey explained, "I must confess that I should feel mortified to see a Lieutenant with a broad Pendant while I wave a narrow one." To Chauncey's satisfaction, Hamilton agreed with him and was "not a little surprized [sic] at the pretensions set up by Capt. Leonard."²⁶

Unfortunately this was not the last time these two men came into conflict. They both remained in contact with each other during the rest of the summer without apparent difficulty, but probably because the spheres of their responsibilities (Chauncey for the navy yard and Leonard for his gunboats) did not overlap too much. Chauncey, however, was always sensitive to the prerogatives of his seniority and he did not think kindly towards those who transgressed upon them. This did not bode well for a harmonious relationship between the two men when acting in a close superior-subordinate situation as they would on Lake Ontario. Perhaps Hamilton chose Leonard because he believed that he and Chauncey had worked well together at New York City or because the newly promoted Leonard was unlikely to contest his appointment to the lakes. Even as early as the fall of 1812, most naval officers would prefer to serve any place other than on a fresh water lake, and this included master commandants with more seniority than Leonard. As the future would prove, choosing James T. Leonard was not Hamilton's wisest decision.

After the *Madison* had been framed and it was time to add the planking, it was decided to "salt" her. Placing salt between the inner and outer hull planking as a preservative had been done to the army brig *Adams* on Lake Erie over a decade earlier and to the *Oneida* in 1809 with considerable success. The salt-carrying merchant schooners on Lake Ontario also aged well. It was believed that without salting a wooden warship made from unseasoned wood and sailing in fresh water would need a major repair every five or six years. Accordingly, on 10 October 1812, even before the *Madison*'s keel was laid, Chauncey purchased 60 barrels of salt from Salina (now Syracuse) for use by the *Madison*.²⁷

The *Madison* was launched on 26 November 1812 after only 45 days from laying the keel "amidst the acclamations of hundreds."²⁸ There remained the task of completing her interior, masting, rigging and arming her. As winter had arrived and the *Madison* would shortly be frozen in the ice, much of that work would be deferred until March.

The total cost of building the *Madison*, and the number of men employed by Henry Eckford in doing so, is not yet precisely known. In addition to the \$5,000 Eckford received at New York City before he left for Sackets Harbor (part of that amount was

likely spent on the *Madison*), on 9 December Chauncey ordered Eckford paid an additional \$19,300 for work on the *Madison*.²⁹ Additional vouchers acknowledging receipt of payment for labor and workmen’s board expenses incurred between 12 December 1812 and 1 March 1813, during the *Madison*’s fitting-out period, totaled \$4,656.25.³⁰

Some specific facts are known based on the above data. The average daily wage for

Item	Cost
Labor	\$11,000
Iron	\$3,000
Ironmongery	\$1,000
Ship Chandlery	\$2,500
Forwarding men & property	\$9,000
Lumber	\$4,500
Total	\$31,000

*Table 3 – Partial Cost of the Madison
Paper A, 8 December 1812, SNLRC, 1813
vol 8 item 31, M125 roll 33.*

Eckford’s workmen was \$1.87½ per day, much higher than at New York City or Boston. Eckford’s foreman, Henry Eagle, received \$2.50 per day. By his agreement with the workmen, Eckford was required to provide board at an average cost to him of \$2.50 per week after the *Madison* was launched when the size of the work force was reduced.³¹

The cost of the *Madison*’s sails, rigging, camboose, armament, etc. has not yet been discovered, nor has the total cost of shipping these items to Sackets Harbor. Many of these items were provided from New York City by

Navy Agent John Bullus. Following the launch of the *Madison*, the Navy Department asked Chauncey for a summary of the total expenses incurred on the lakes so far and he needed some of this data from Bullus:

*As many articles have been ordered for which no bills have been rendered (the sails and rigging for the Madison for instance) I have to request that you will be pleased to add to the enclosed paper marked A all such expenses as I have omitted and then transmit that paper to the navy Department and send me a copy.*³²

Unfortunately no copy of “Paper A” with the navy agent’s additions has yet been found. The incomplete copy sent to the Navy Department by Chauncey detailing the *Madison*’s expenses, up to early December 1812, is shown in Table 3.³³

Overall, the total cost of building the hull, masts and spars of the *Madison* was at least \$36,000.³⁴ This value can be compared with the cost of building the sloop of war *Wasp*, a smaller vessel, at Newburyport, Massachusetts in 1813 which was \$26,000, at least \$10,000 less than the *Madison*. The *Wasp*’s cordage and rigging cost an additional \$14,000 and her sails an additional \$12,400. The cost of the *Wasp*’s interior work, block work, ballast, anchors, etc. but not including armament, boats, sea stores, coppering the hull or the cost of water casks (the last two unnecessary on a fresh water lake), added \$10,000 for a total cost of \$62,000.³⁵ Adding the difference in the cost of the hull plus transportation to Sackets Harbor, the *Madison*’s total cost could not have been less than \$75,000.

Also missing from the records is the total cost of the timber (“lumber”) cut for the *Madison*. What evidence exists indicates that the wood used to build the *Madison* was cut on private property without permission from the landowner and some of it was not paid for until much later, if at all.³⁶

Before Chauncey left for Lake Erie in mid-December, he informed Lieutenant Woolsey, the senior officer remaining at Sackets Harbor, that during his absence he wanted

*The masts and bowsprit of the Madison to be got in as soon as they are ready and that vessel kept clear of snow and chips by the sailors as the time of the carpenters is too valuable to be employed upon that service.*³⁷

Woolsey was not expected to remain in charge of the station for very long. Master Commandant James T. Leonard was expected to arrive any day and Chauncey left detailed instructions for him as well, including orders respecting the completion of the *Madison*:

*You will cause the Madison to be fitted as fast as possible: her lower masts and bowsprit are to be got in as soon as ready and 12 guns mounted and kept ready for service as soon as she is in a state to mount them. Her sails and rigging when they arrive ought to be examined and dried if necessary, and any thing else done to prepare her for service by the Spring.*³⁸

The reason for mounting only 12 guns, half her planned primary armament, was presumably because only those guns on the side facing the harbor entrance would be needed for defense while the *Madison* was frozen in the ice. Such an arrangement, however, would place over 11 tons of weight on one side of the hull.³⁹ Apparently the inevitable list (unless compensated by ballast or some other means) was not seen as a problem.

After dealing with a number of other matters, such as approving payments to vendors, organizing the Marines for the winter and approving court martial sentences, Commodore Chauncey left Sackets Harbor for Lake Erie on 13 December. He was confident that he had provided for every contingency that would likely occur in his absence. The future would demonstrate that his confidence was not completely justified.

Armament

Based on the guns sent by Chauncey to Sackets Harbor in September 1812, the original brig was to be armed with 22, 32-pound carronades. The 22 carronades became 24 when Eckford changed the design from a brig to a ship.⁴⁰

Two weeks before the *Madison*'s launch, Commodore Chauncey reported to Secretary Hamilton that she would be armed with two 9-pound cannon in addition to the carronades.⁴¹ Although this established that the *Madison* was built pierced for 13 guns a side, those 9-pounders were apparently never installed.⁴² They were probably to be mounted in the foremost gun ports for use as "chase guns," a nine-pounder having an excellent reputation for the range and accuracy that was more important than shot weight when used for that purpose. Chauncey had two 9-pounders shipped to Sackets Harbor in September 1812 but they ended up that fall as part of the



Naval carronades were usually mounted on slide carriages that were swivelled by means of a pin at the front and trucks (wheels) at the rear. Another style of carriage used a handcrew to control elevation instead of a wedge. Photograph by the author on board the brig Niagara, Erie PA, 2000.

armament of Lieutenant Jesse Elliott's schooner *Conquest*.⁴³ Those guns were already mounted on board the schooner when Chauncey referred to them as destined for the *Madison*, which makes Chauncey's reference to them hard to understand unless the schooner's use was temporary, which it was. The two 9-pounders were moved to the larger schooner *Governor Tompkins* in 1813. There is no record that these cannon were ever on board the *Madison*.

Three days after she was launched, Chauncey wrote Navy Agent John Bullus at New York ordering four additional 32-pound carronades to be sent to Sackets Harbor to complete the *Madison*'s armament. He asked that the "slides & all the necessary apparatus" be provided for two of the guns, stating "the other 2 I can fit here." As 22 of those carronades were already at Sackets Harbor, it is not clear why an additional four (instead of two) were needed by the *Madison*. In the fall of 1812, four of the 32-pound carronades were arming the *Governor Tompkins*, but those guns were removed and available to the *Madison* in 1813. Since Chauncey ordered slide carriages for only two of the new carronades, perhaps the other two were replacing ones that were defective, never actually arrived, were used at Fort Tompkins on truck (wheeled) carriages, or were sent on to Lake Erie. Whatever the case, Chauncey wanted the guns sent before ice closed the Hudson River. He was adamant that he did not want to have to "wait for these guns in the Spring."⁴⁴

Whatever changes to her armament may have been planned or actually made since her launch, the *Madison* sailed on her first cruise, to raid York, Upper Canada at the end of April 1813, armed with at least 18, 32 pound carronades. For some reason, six of her carronades had been taken out and perhaps one replaced with a 12-pound cannon. During the court martial of Master Commandant James T. Leonard the following December, Chauncey's testimony addressed that point:

Question by the Court: Was there not a difference in the armament of that ship [Madison] when she lay at the dock and when she went to sea?

*Answer by Chauncey: She went to sea with six guns less than when she lay at the dock — but had the same guns on board excepting the six taken out, believe there was one carronade changed for a 12 pounder.*⁴⁵

It is not known at what point the *Madison*'s armament changed again, but by 10 June 1813 her armament was reported to be 20, 32 pound carronades and four 12 pound cannon.⁴⁶

Fitting Out

Beginning before he left on his visit to the new Lake Erie naval station at Black Rock (north of Buffalo) Commodore Chauncey began his effort to obtain a crew for the *Madison* as well as its complement of Marines. Since the 100 Marines already at Sackets Harbor were allocated to existing ships, he informed the Navy Department that at least 100 more Marines were needed, most going to the *Madison* and the vessels building on Lake Erie.⁴⁷

On his arrival at Sackets Harbor, shortly after Chauncey's departure, 34 year old Master Commandant Leonard took up his new duties with diligence. Unfortunately his professional competence was not matched by his personal judgment. He arrived at

Sackets Harbor with a wife who was warmly welcomed into local society and quickly invited to attend various parties, teas, dances and other gatherings including at least one at the home of Brigadier General Jacob Brown in Brownville.

Over the next few weeks, however, word spread that there seemed to be something odd about “Mrs. Leonard.” That there was. She was indeed a wife, just not Leonard’s wife. She was later referred to as “Mrs. Williamson,” whose husband was simply “not present.” For the moment, however, Leonard and his “wife” took up housekeeping together in Sackets Harbor. As the navy’s senior officer present, any speculation about their relationship was muted.

That changed when Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor on 19 January 1813. It did not take long for him to become aware of the controversy surrounding “Mrs. Leonard.” Chauncey, believing Leonard was not acting as a gentleman in the matter, strongly suggested that he send the woman back to New York City. Leonard agreed, did so, and the controversy died down.

A few weeks later, Chauncey left Sackets Harbor for a month-long trip to Albany and New York City. No sooner had he departed than Leonard’s “wife” reappeared and the two resumed living together, this time openly as man and mistress. With Leonard again the senior naval officer present any speculation about their situation was done quietly. It is certain, however, that “Mrs. Leonard” received no further party invitations.

Isaac Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor on 3 March 1813 and was pleased to find work on the *Madison* progressing well. She was frozen in the ice along with the other vessels but otherwise in good condition. He was not so pleased, however, to see the *Madison*’s captain and his mistress strolling hand-in-hand down Main Street. Though annoyed at Leonard’s failure to keep his promise to send the woman away permanently, Chauncey decided that so long as Leonard’s personal life did not interfere with his official duties, he would ignore the situation.

If that was where it ended, Leonard could likely have continued to enjoy his partner’s charms undisturbed but this was not to be. Before Chauncey left for Lake Erie in December, he had ordered Leonard, as captain of the *Madison*, to begin sleeping on board his ship as soon as she was complete enough to allow it. On his return in January, Chauncey repeated that order. Leonard, however, found this order disagreeable as it denied him the pleasure of a bed companion. Therefore, unknown to Chauncey, Leonard began sleeping in his quarters on shore alongside his mistress and the few men on board the *Madison* were left to their own devices.

Trouble from Leonard’s infatuation was apparent early in April. With ice still in the harbor, the *Madison* was “aground at the Dock” in front of the *Lady of the Lake* which was then nearing completion. When it was time to refloat the *Madison*, Chauncey

Requested Capt Leonard to use every exertion to get her off, as well to enable us to launch the Lady of the Lake as to fit the ship for service, and take her ballast in — The day she was hove off came down along side of her and found them not heaving, nor Capt Leonard on board, I gave the necessary directions and hove the ship off, afloat, Capt Leonard did not come down until the ship was partly off.⁴⁸

While Leonard’s absence at such a critical time was disturbing, Chauncey took no action against him and Leonard continued his dalliance with “Mrs. Williamson.”

Leonard might have gotten away with this for a while longer had not Mother Nature interfered. After the *Madison* was afloat it was clear that the ice in Black River Bay was beginning to break up. Leonard, however, took the *Madison* outside the harbor (“over the bar”) into the bay and she was “left in the ice in that situation with all her yards across and without ballast.”⁴⁹

On the night of April 12, the ice did break up and a strong wind caused the *Madison* to drift towards the shore on the far side of Black River Bay. Leonard, snug in bed with his mistress, was blissfully unaware of his ship’s predicament. The officers and crew, lacking experience, proved unable to handle the situation. It would only be a short time before the *Madison* would be on shore and severely damaged, even wrecked. Fortunately, Isaac Chauncey awoke early the next morning, saw that the *Madison* “had drifted from her moorings about half a cross the Bay.” He was rowed out to her and found Leonard was not on board and the *Madison* under the command of Acting Lieutenant Francis Gregory. Immediate action was needed because, although the *Madison* was no longer drifting when Chauncey arrived on board,

*An immense field of ice which was then drifting in from the westward would strike her and take her on shore and which did actually strike the ship.*⁵⁰

Chauncey ordered Lieutenant Melancthon Woolsey, in the *Oneida*, to send an anchor and a sheet cable which was positioned just in time to resist the impact of the ice. Afterwards, Chauncey and the crew “by great exertions, before night, got the ship to a place of safety.”

That same day Chauncey informed James Leonard that he was under arrest for disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, and dissolute and immoral practices, the last being, of course, related to his public dalliance with “Mrs. Williamson.” Until his court martial could be convened, Leonard was required to confine himself “to a district four miles square in or about this village.”⁵¹ This was the standard restriction for an officer under arrest but the limits were somewhat more generous than usual.⁵² Under arrest, Leonard was no longer able to serve as captain of the *Madison*. Chauncey had to find a replacement.

Three days later Chauncey wrote Navy Secretary William Jones informing him of Leonard’s arrest and asking that Jones authorize Leonard’s court martial. In his letter to Jones, Chauncey spent as much ink describing Leonard’s activities with his mistress as he did in describing Leonard’s negligence with the *Madison*. Chauncey justified that by telling Jones:

*“He now lives with her as publicly as if she was his wife, however criminal this conduct may be in itself by putting public opinion so much at defiance, I should not have noticed it at this time if it had not led to a criminal neglect of his duty.”*⁵³

Jones promptly authorized Chauncey to convene a court martial to try Leonard on the charges preferred against him.⁵⁴ Chauncey acknowledged this authority but informed Jones that “at present it would be impossible” to bring Leonard to trial.⁵⁵ Chauncey continued to find reasons to delay Leonard’s trial despite numerous protests from Leonard to Secretary Jones and orders from Jones to try Leonard immediately. Finally Chauncey ran out of excuses and Leonard’s court martial was convened in December 1813. He was convicted on most charges and sentenced to be suspended from rank and

privileges for a year from the date of his arrest and to receive a navy-wide public reprimand for his actions. The exact identity and fate of “Mrs. Leonard” remains unknown.

In early February, after his return from Erie and Black Rock, Isaac Chauncey reorganized the assignments of the pursers on the station. Samuel T. Anderson, the naval storekeeper at the New York Navy Yard, who had been acting as a purser at Sackets Harbor, was ordered to turn over most of his accounts to Purser Henry Fry but retain those for the incomplete *Madison* until the arrival of Purser Edward Fitzgerald, who had been serving as purser at the Black Rock naval station.⁵⁶ Fitzgerald finally arrived at Sackets Harbor in May.

Shortly before Chauncey left Sackets Harbor on his trip to Albany and New York he reported to the new Navy Secretary William Jones, that

*I have 22 guns mounted upon the Madison and have got her well manned. We keep the ice cut from around her and have every thing in a state of preparation to repel an attack at a moments' notice either night or day.*⁵⁷

At the same time, Chauncey assigned 24 year old Acting Lieutenant Augustus H. M. Conkling to the *Madison*.⁵⁸ Conkling received his midshipman's warrant in 1809, became an acting lieutenant in October 1812 and would receive his lieutenant's commission in July 1813. Before arriving at Sackets Harbor he had served on board the frigates *John Adams* and *Constitution*.⁵⁹


Midshipman William Chauncey Wetmore was the next officer appointed to the *Madison*.⁶⁰ Wetmore was appointed an acting midshipman in September 1812 at age 14 and received his warrant in February 1813, backdated (for some unknown reason) to the previous June. The *Madison* was his first ship.⁶¹

Another officer assigned to the *Madison* was Sailing Master Sylvester M. Kemper.⁶² Receiving his warrant only in November 1812, like Wetmore, *Madison* was his first ship.⁶³

The next officers assigned to the *Madison* were Sailing Master William Lowe and Midshipman John Clark.⁶⁴ Lowe received his warrant in November 1812, arrived at Sackets Harbor in December and was assigned to the schooner *Growler*.⁶⁵ Midshipman Clark's warrant dated from June 1812 but he spent time at Washington DC before arriving at Sackets Harbor in November 1812 and, like Lowe, being assigned to the *Growler*.⁶⁶

The final officer assigned to the *Madison* before Chauncey's departure was 14 year old Midshipman Philip F. Livingston.⁶⁷ Livingston's warrant was dated September 1811 but he had seen very little actual service before his arrival at Sackets Harbor in October 1812. On arrival he was assigned to the schooner *Conquest* where he survived an attempt by Seaman Thomas Campbell to murder him on 26 October.⁶⁸

Overall, the *Madison*'s original group of junior officers had very little experience. Presumably Chauncey was depending on Master Commandant Leonard and his own presence on board as commodore to provide whatever



guidance and

training these officers would require.

The *Madison*, however, was still lacking the Marine complement that Chauncey had requested in December. That shortage required him to ask New York Militia Brigadier General Richard Dodge, commanding the military force at Sackets Harbor, to provide a sergeant, corporal and 15 privates "to do duty as sentinels about the Squadron under my command."⁶⁹

During Chauncey's absence in February and early March, the *Madison* and *Oneida*, although ice-bound, were so positioned as to be the key components of the naval defense of Sackets Harbor. Chauncey ordered that the crews of five of the small armed schooners are to

*Repair on board of the Madison in all cases of alarm as those vessels are perfectly protected by the guns of that ship and the Oneida.*⁷⁰

On his return from Albany and New York in early March, Chauncey assigned Midshipman John W. Wendell and Acting Lieutenant Francis Gregory to the *Madison*.⁷¹ Midshipman Wendell's appointment was dated June 1812 and he was ordered to Sackets Harbor in October following three months "tuition" at New York.⁷²

In terms of experience, 23 year old Midshipman Francis Gregory was a refreshing change. He received his warrant in 1809, became an Acting Sailing Master at New Orleans in 1811 and was appointed an Acting Lieutenant by Chauncey the same day he assigned him to the *Madison*. Prior to his promotion, Gregory served on the Atlantic on board *Revenge* and *Vesuvius*, as commanding officer of gunboat number 182 at New Orleans and on board the schooner *Hamilton* at Sackets Harbor.⁷³

Probably due to the inexperience of the officers, disciplinary problems soon arose on board the *Madison*. The first incident took place on 7 April when Acting Lieutenant Conkling struck a quarter gunner with his fists and then took a mallet "and struck him so violently on the head that he fell senseless at your feet and is now lying in a dangerous situation."⁷⁴ Placed under arrest, Conkling was later transferred to the brig *Oneida*. The next day Midshipman Livingston was arrested for striking seaman Isaac Minix.⁷⁵ He too was transferred, this time to the schooner *Scourge*.

During March and April 1813 the *Madison*'s wardroom was furnished with items purchased from the Sackets Harbor firm of Samuel F. Hooker & Company. These items, listed as they appeared on the vouchers, are shown in Table 4 on page 13. The total cost,

2 Frying pans	2 Tin tea kettles
Pepper box	4 Decanters
12 Plates	12 Knives
Iron pot	6 Tea spoons
6 Table spoons	Soup ladle
3 Dishes	3 Tumblers
Table bell	2 Salts
6 Wine glasses	Cruet
Wash basin	Teapot
Creamer	Cups and saucers
Bowl	Mustard pot
Pitcher	Set of cups
2 Candlesticks	2 Plated candlesticks
Plates	Dish
2 Butter boats	

Table 4 – The Madison's "Cabin Furniture" as of 20 April 1813, from Isaac Chauncey's settled accounts.

\$48.75, was more than a month's pay for a navy lieutenant but quite modest compared with the expenses of some American warships on the Atlantic.⁷⁶

Other expenditures in early 1813 included a fife and drum, presumably for the *Madison's* Marine complement. These two items cost \$13.00, more than an able seaman's monthly wage in 1812.⁷⁷

On 9 April 1813, Master Commandant Leonard received an order from Commodore Chauncey to have the *Madison* "prepared in every respect as soon as possible for actual service against the enemy."⁷⁸ This order Leonard would never have a chance to obey. As described above, four days later he was under arrest and no longer commanding the *Madison*.

On 16 April, as part of the stores ordered from New York City for the *General Pike*, now under construction at Sackets Harbor, Commodore Chauncey ordered two 2,800 pound anchors and two 15-inch cables, each 120 fathoms long, for use by the *Madison*.⁷⁹

With preparations for the raid on York in Upper Canada (now Toronto) close to completion, Chauncey needed to a new captain for the *Madison*. On 17 April he chose 31 year old Lieutenant Jesse Duncan Elliott.⁸⁰



Jesse Duncan Elliott

Elliott received his midshipman's warrant in 1804, was appointed an acting lieutenant in 1809 and received his lieutenant's commission a year later. Before becoming captain of the *Madison*, Elliott served on board the frigates *Chesapeake*, *Essex* and *John Adams* and the brigs *Argus* and *Vixen*. Ordered to Black Rock in September 1812, he commanded an attack across the Niagara River in October then arrived at Sackets Harbor in early November where he commanded the schooner *Conquest* during Chauncey's attack on Kingston later that month. An experienced and competent officer, he would later be promoted to master commandant and transferred to Erie, Pennsylvania where, as second to Oliver

Hazard Perry, he commanded the brig *Niagara* during the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813.⁸¹

Also on 17 April, Chauncey informed Secretary Jones that the *Madison* was finally ready for service "completely rigged and all her guns are remounted." Plenty of ice, however, was still in Black River Bay and it would likely be several days before his squadron could sail for York.⁸² At the same time Chauncey had to deal with a complaint from Purser Henry Fry. Fry had written to Secretary Jones complaining that Chauncey had "unjustly deprived" him of the *Madison* in favor of Purser Edward Fitzgerald. Chauncey explained that he had given the *Madison* to Fitzgerald because he "thought it justice to him" to allow him to continue serving the men transferred from Lake Erie to the *Madison*. Both Jones and Fry apparently accepted Chauncey's explanation and there the matter ended. The incident, which also involved Purser Alexander Darragh and Storekeeper Samuel T. Anderson, was indicative of the difficulties Chauncey faced that spring attempting to cobble together an effective naval force on two separate lakes with limited resources.⁸³

York

By the end of the third week of April 1813, Commodore Isaac Chauncey's squadron was finally ready to begin the first phase of the American 1813 campaign to conquer Canada. The plan, prepared in conjunction with Major General Henry Dearborn and Brigadier General Zebulon Pike and approved by both the army and navy secretaries as well as by President Madison, called for a raid on York, then an attack to capture Fort George followed by the capture of Kingston. With the ice now out of Black River Bay, on 22 April Pike's brigade along with detachments from the Rifle Regiment and some other units embarked on the ships of the squadron and were ready to proceed across Lake Ontario to York. Generals Dearborn and Pike with their small staffs joined Chauncey on board the *Madison*. Sailing, as Chauncey reported to Secretary Jones, awaited only "the first fair wind and from present appearances it will be tomorrow."⁸⁴

The next day, 23 April, at the "urgent request of Major General Dearborn" but against his better judgment, Chauncey sailed. It was too soon. He had barely cleared the harbor when the weather abruptly deteriorated. High winds and heavy rain made life miserable, particularly when "not more than one half of the troops could get below at one time." As Chauncey reported to Secretary Jones the next day, after the *Madison* sprung her main topsail yard, the *Hamilton* lost her fore gaff and the small schooners were in danger of capsizing, he was forced to return to Sackets Harbor. Chauncey would try again but only "as soon as I think the wind and weather is such as I ought to risk this fleet upon the lake situated as it is."⁸⁵ Fortunately for the plan, Chauncey only had to wait two days for weather that satisfied him and the squadron sailed for York on 25 May.

Chauncey knew that he had to get his 13-vessel squadron from Sackets Harbor to York intact and together. Neither he nor anyone else on board had ever attempted to manage that many vessels sailing in company. To make matters worse, half the journey would take place at night. Chauncey was further inconvenienced by a set of signal books that did not all contain night signals. Chauncey drew up a collection of sailing formations to be used by the squadron and he improvised a set of night signals. Chauncey also prepared a detailed list of the order in which the troops would be disembarked from the various vessels. Even with those preparations in place, the voyage was extremely risky. If he encountered severe weather as before (it was, after all, still only April), the entire operation could fail.

The operation could not be allowed to fail. After the series of military disasters and defeats in 1812 and earlier in 1813, the United States badly needed a victory.⁸⁶ A failure to land or, worse, a repulse at York, would greatly encourage those in Congress who opposed the war to push harder for peace, possibly by cutting off the funding for the war. Chauncey knew the war was already very unpopular in many parts of the country, especially in the New England states and even in northern New York. Success at York was not an option.


Fortunately the journey to York was uneventful from a naval point of view but it was a new experience for the troops, most of whom had never been at sea before. The overcrowded conditions must have made the trip extremely unpleasant, including those sailing on the *Madison*. Although the largest vessel she had an entire regiment of troops on board.

We have on board of the Madison about 600 Souls and many of the small vessels [are] even more crowded than ourselves.⁸⁷

The operation itself was very risky. Since the United States Army and Navy had never conducted an amphibious landing there was no body of experience for Chauncey to draw upon when making his plans. Had he thought of everything? Furthermore, no one knew how strong York's defenses really were or how many British troops were now stationed there. Finally, after spending two nights and more than a day sailing on the lake, how many troops would be too seasick to be effective during and even after the landing?

To everyone's great relief, the landing went smoothly and without any major difficulties. The British inflicted some casualties on Pike's troops at the water's edge but the defenders were too few and too disorganized to resist for long. It was a near-perfect example of how to conduct an enemy-opposed amphibious assault and its success was due to Chauncey, Dearborn, and Pike's careful planning plus a bit of luck.

Unfortunately Pike's luck did not long survive his reaching dry land. As he and his troops were closing in on the village of York, the British set fire to their stone gunpowder magazine which exploded violently. The explosion tossed the stones high into the air and a big one landed on Pike, crushing his spine and leaving him mortally wounded. Several hundred other soldiers, mostly American but some British, were also killed or wounded by this rain of rocks which no one had anticipated.



The American attack on York, 27 April 1813 drawn by Surgeon Amasa Trowbridge. The Madison is in the center foreground with the Oneida behind and to the left, shown as a ship instead of a brig. Trowbridge, who was present during the battle, drew the sketch from memory around 1850.

Pike was carried to a small boat, rowed to the armed merchant schooner *Pert* anchored close to shore. She then sailed to the *Madison* where General Pike was taken on board. Fortunately a skilled surgeon was available. The previous fall Chauncey had enticed Dr. Walter Buchanan, an experienced and highly respected physician, away from his practice in New York City to serve as the hospital surgeon at Sackets Harbor and he had accompanied the squadron to York. Buchanan did what he could for Pike but his injuries were well beyond the ability of medical science to handle in 1813. All Buchanan could

do was try to make Pike as comfortable as possible. Pike died a short time later in Buchanan's arms, but only after he had the consolation of hearing that the attack was a success – York was in American hands. A costly victory to be sure, but a victory none the less.⁸⁸

Pike's body remained on board the *Madison* and was eventually returned to Sackets Harbor for burial. Since his remains would not arrive until 11 May, it is certain that some steps were taken to preserve the body. This was probably by placing it in a barrel of whiskey taken from the *Madison*'s supply but this detail has apparently gone unrecorded as has the fate of the whiskey afterwards.

The *National Intelligencer* reported that the *Madison*'s crew suffered only three casualties during the attack. Two were African-American: Seaman John Campbell and Ordinary Seaman Richard Welch. The third was Seaman David C. Bunnell. Campbell was badly wounded, the other two only slightly. For some as yet unknown reason none of these three men appear on the *Madison*'s existing pay and muster roll records. There is a John Campbell, but he is shown as a boatswain arriving on board the *Madison* from Black Rock shortly before the attack on Fort George.⁸⁹

These casualties, however, were not the only ones treated on board the *Madison* during and after the battle. Surgeon Walter Buchanan reported some years later that he also treated “between 60 & 70 officers & men of the Army” plus casualties from all the small schooners.⁹⁰

Fort George

The original plan kept the troops at York for only two days, then Chauncey's squadron would quickly carry them to Four Mile Creek, just east of Fort Niagara, to join the troops already there for an attack on Fort George the following day. The plan emphasized speed. Again, the weather interfered. For over a week squalls and high winds from the east kept Chauncey's ships pinned at York. It was 8 May before the weather moderated, the wind changed direction and the now sick and exhausted members of Pike's brigade, who had spent the entire time waiting on board ship, arrived at Niagara. The unanticipated delay had taken its toll on the men. Chauncey himself witnessed its effects on board the *Madison*.

*They had been so long crowded on board of the vessels without the opportunity of getting below or changing their wet clothes that a fever was breaking out among the seamen and soldiers that was truly alarming — the soldiers were reduced to less than 1000 effective men and we had about 100 seamen sick in the fleet.*⁹¹

It would be two weeks before most of the men would again be fit for service; some would never recover. One such was Master Commandant Leonard's younger brother, Sailing Master Frederick Augustus Leonard. The 22 year old Leonard commanded the schooner *Pert* during the attack on York. Shortly afterwards he contracted the “prevailing fever” and on 13 May he died and was buried at Sackets Harbor. James Leonard's own situation was not made any easier by the knowledge that he was responsible for his brother being ordered to Sackets Harbor.⁹²

Chauncey himself took advantage of the delay to return with the *Madison* and most of his squadron to Sackets Harbor where he arrived on 11 May to take on board Brigadier

General John Chandler's brigade and transport them back to Niagara. Most of the squadron sailed on the evening of 16 May with Chandler's brigade on board. The *Lady of the Lake* sailed on 19 May carrying General Chandler himself and his suite. Chauncey and the *Madison* remained at Sackets Harbor until 22 May waiting for reinforcements to arrive to bolster the defenses of Sackets Harbor. He then took 350 men of Colonel Alexander Macomb's Third Artillery Regiment on board the *Madison* and sailed for Niagara. Once again the weather was a factor. The trip took three days due to light westerly winds.⁹³

After his return to Niagara, the *Madison* acquired a number of additional men. This raised the total on board, exclusive of any army passengers, to over 300 – a number considerably in excess of the usual crew size and, unusually, more than enough to fight the carronades on both sides of the ship simultaneously with full gun crews. In particular, there were many more midshipmen, quarter gunners and seamen than was usual for a ship the size of the *Madison*. The details are shown in Table 5 on page 19. While it is possible that some of these men were present in name only (they had to be attached to a specific ship or shore station to get paid) most were actually on board that May. In July almost all of the *Madison*'s crew would be transferred to the frigate *General Pike*. Chauncey's keeping them on board the *Madison* instead of distributing them among all the vessels in his squadron may have been to prepare for that move. It would give Chauncey and his officers a chance to train these men to work as a team. As Chauncey was not expecting to fight the British at this time, it was a good opportunity to conduct that training.

This manpower situation calls into question the accuracy of Chauncey's complaint to Secretary Jones made two days after the capture of Fort George:

*We are however still much in want of men, and if none arrive before my return to Sackets Harbor I shall be obliged to dismantle the fleet upon this lake, to man that upon Erie.*⁹⁴

Chauncey told Jones he had sent Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry and 55 seamen to Black Rock "to take the five vessels there to Erie as soon as possible." However, the records show that the men represented in Table 5 all remained on Lake Ontario, so the men sent to Erie were in addition to that number. Chauncey never dismantled any part of his fleet on Lake Ontario to provide men for the squadron on Lake Erie, even after Perry's repeated requests for reinforcements during the summer of 1813.


Rank	Number	Rank	Number
Armorer	1	Marine Corporals	2
Boatswain's Mates	9	Marine Privates	26
Boatswain's Yeoman	1	Marine Second Lieutenant (Kellogg)	1
Boatswains (Campbell, McNally)	2	Marine Sergeants	2
Boys	3	Master's Mates (Cummings, Taylor)	2
Captain's Clerks (Sands, Warne)	2	Midshipmen (Adams, Alby, Bennett, Brailsford, Clark, Freelon, Montgomery, Sands, Smith, Walker, Wendell, Wetmore)	12
Carpenter (Heyden)	1	Ordinary Seamen	56
Carpenter's Mates	5	Pilot (Montgomery)	1
Chaplain (Anderson)	1	Purser (Fitzgerald)	1
Commodore (Chauncey)	1	Quarter Gunners	11
Cook	1	Quartermasters	4
Cooper	1	Sailing Master (Lowe)	1
Coxswain	1	Sailmaker (Raburg)	1
Gunner (Osborn)	1	Seamen	139
Landsman	1	Stewards	3
Lieutenant Commandant (Elliott)	1	Surgeon (McReynolds)	1
Lieutenants (Drury, Gregory, Wragg)	3	Surgeon's Mates (Garrison, Palmer)	2
Marine Captain (Smith)	1	Unknown	2
		Total	303

Table 5 – Madison's Crew as of 26 May 1813
Muster Rolls, NAUS, RG45, T829, roll 16 pp.85-95, 99

In any event, more men were on the way. A month before, William Bainbridge had informed Secretary Jones that he had dispatched fifty additional men from the frigate *Constitution* to the lakes to augment the 100 seamen he had already sent. Chauncey acknowledged the arrival of these men when he returned to Sackets Harbor on 1 June.⁹⁵

As at York, the plan for the attack on Fort George was risky. Although this time the American forces knew more about what they were facing, the defenses were a lot stronger and much better organized than they were at York. While the Americans had over three times the force they did at York and they easily outnumbered the British defenders, it would still be a hard fight. A mismanaged landing (now three times as complex as at York), an unexpected local success by the British, failure of Chauncey's ships to suppress the defender's lakeside artillery, or the death of a critical leader, such as Colonel Winfield Scott, could cause the entire assault to fail.

This time Chauncey's squadron's job was more that of providing fire support than it was to transport and land troops. Most of the assault force started out in small boats and were rowed from Four Mile Creek to the landing site just west of the village of Niagara. As at York, the *Madison* served as headquarters ship for both Chauncey and the army commanders, led, once again, by Major General Henry Dearborn. Before and during the attack, most of the close-in fire support was provided by the armed schooners while the deeper-draft *Madison* and *Oneida* remained well offshore.



"The Taking of Fort George" appeared in the *Philadelphia magazine Portfolio* in 1817. The *Madison* is shown in the center foreground bombarding the British positions on shore. The artist has drawn the *Madison* with too few broadside gun ports.

During the attack, a wind from the east and a heavy sea delayed the troops on board the *Madison* and *Oneida* from boarding small boats and getting ashore. Fortunately, events had proceeded so well that morning and Fort George was taken so quickly that this delay did not matter.⁹⁶

As at York, the attack on the morning of 27 May 1813 was successful. Fort George was taken, British Brigadier General John Vincent's battered defenders were in full retreat, and this time the British did not explode their gunpowder magazine. Finally, though wounded, Colonel Winfield Scott did survive. Twice in one month the army and Isaac Chauncey's squadron had performed a near-perfect enemy-opposed amphibious assault, an extremely difficult task even today.

During the attack, the *Madison* suffered only one man wounded: Ordinary Seaman William Wells. The *Madison*'s muster roll lists Wells as having arrived on board the *Madison* from Black Rock shortly before the attack.⁹⁷

By that afternoon the American forces were in firm possession of both Fort George and the village of Niagara and all British resistance in the area had ceased.⁹⁸ Chauncey's squadron was safely anchored at the mouth of the Niagara River and Chauncey himself left the *Madison* to confer on shore with General Dearborn. With a supply depot at Fort Niagara just across the river, Chauncey's squadron did not have to provide logistical support for the army. His job at Niagara was over and he could have taken his squadron back to Sackets Harbor at any time he wished.

Sackets Harbor and Afterwards

At this point Isaac Chauncey faced a difficult decision. Before he left Sackets Harbor he had expressed his concern both to Secretary Jones and to the army that he believed the harbor was still too weakly defended.⁹⁹ More reinforcements had been ordered but had

they arrived? All Chauncey knew for sure was that the presence of his squadron would safeguard Sackets Harbor.

Chauncey could have sailed the next day. Had he done so he would have probably arrived at Sackets Harbor about sunrise on 29 May, just in time to interfere with the British who were themselves conducting an attack – on Sackets Harbor.

The British squadron, now under the control of the Royal Navy commanded by Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo (who had arrived on Lake Ontario only two weeks earlier), was definitely not prepared at that time to do battle with Chauncey. Caught between Chauncey's squadron, which would have had the wind advantage, and the American shore, Yeo would have lacked maneuvering room and, for the only time in the war, been completely unable to avoid a fight. Although the British were a superior force at this time, having just added the 22-gun corvette *Wolfe*, Yeo would have been caught with his decks packed with troops or with those troops ashore and with little time to recover them. Either way, Chauncey would have had a good opportunity to eliminate the British naval force on Lake Ontario, and that could have changed the outcome of the war. Even if Chauncey had mis-managed the naval engagement, any British forces left stranded at Sackets Harbor (including perhaps the civil and military commander in Canada, Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, who had foolishly accompanied the landing force), would certainly have been lost.

Fortunately for the British, instead of leaving Niagara the day after the fall of Fort George, the American squadron remained for four more days. Why?

President Madison, Navy Secretary Jones, the newspapers and especially his peers commanding the army were all full of praise for Chauncey's achievements at York.¹⁰⁰ Now he had done it again at Fort George and could look forward to receiving even more applause. He had been ordered by Navy Secretary William Jones to closely cooperate with the army and that he had certainly done. In a letter to Chauncey, Jones stressed that it was

*Of primary importance to reconcile and harmonize the designs and movements of the combined forces, so that the most perfect understanding and efficient concert may result from their mutual operations.*¹⁰¹

Furthermore, Jones told Chauncey that he was

*Relying upon your cordial and zealous exertions to give full effect to the joint operations of the land and naval forces.*¹⁰²

When General Henry Dearborn encouraged Chauncey to remain at Niagara to be sure the British fleet did not interfere with the army's operations, not wanting to disturb their harmonious relationship, Chauncey cordially complied.

That compliance lasted only until the evening of 30 May when Chauncey received news of the British attack on Sackets Harbor. That was the end of Chauncey's willing compliance with the army's wishes for the rest of the war. From then on he was focused on Yeo's squadron even if that caused problems for the army, which it would certainly do both later that year and especially in the summer of 1814.

For the moment, however, Chauncey's immediate problem was finding Yeo's squadron and dealing with it. He knew that the day before Yeo was no longer near Sackets Harbor

but where was he now? Chauncey guessed that Yeo might have sailed towards York, perhaps with reinforcements. Following an overnight delay waiting for the return of the schooner *Hamilton* from Lewiston with powder and shot from Black Rock, Chauncey left Niagara on the morning of 31 May with the *Madison*, *Oneida* and the schooners and sailed north. Not finding any sign of Yeo at York, the American squadron then sailed east along the north shore of Lake Ontario nearly to Kingston, again with no sign of the British. Chauncey finally returned to Sackets Harbor on the first of June 1813, later learning that during this period Yeo and his squadron had been anchored in Kingston harbor.¹⁰³

When he returned to Sackets Harbor, Chauncey faced the disagreeable fact that almost all of the naval stores gathered to complete the new frigate *General Pike* had been burned. Fearing they were about to be captured by the British, the defenders themselves had set them on fire. It would take several weeks to replace the canvas, rigging, cables, paint and other supplies lost in the flames.

Chauncey's first reaction was to seek a fight with Yeo, although as usual he mixed optimistic plans with pessimistic possibilities:

*If he leaves Kingston I shall meet him. The result may be doubtful but worth the trial.*¹⁰⁴

Chauncey then remained idle at Sackets Harbor for a week until he learned that the British squadron had left Kingston days before and had arrived off Niagara on 7 June. In addition, Dearborn's army had been defeated at Stoney Creek. He then wrote Secretary Jones that

*Immediately upon receiving this information, I prepared to proceed in quest of the enemy, but upon more mature reflection I have determined to remain at this place and preserve the new ship at all hazards.*¹⁰⁵

Chauncey's "mature reflection" convinced him that he had no choice but to wait since without the *General Pike* there was a chance his weaker force would be defeated by Yeo and "if I was beaten, the loss and disappointment to my country would be great and irreparable." Chauncey expected that the *General Pike* would be ready in about four weeks and then (as he promised Secretary Jones) he would seek out Yeo and defeat him. The wait turned out to be six weeks not four. During that time the *Madison* remained quietly at anchor in Black River Bay while the British had complete and uncontested command of Lake Ontario.

Chauncey also used the lack of men to justify his inactivity. Four days after he returned to Sackets Harbor he informed Secretary Jones that

*If men are not transfer'd from other Ships the Ship building at this place & which will be launch'd in six days cannot be man'd nor can the fleet upon Lake Erie be of any manner of use.*¹⁰⁶

By "other ships" Chauncey meant warships on the Atlantic. Chauncey made his point clear when he also told Jones that "I have not the temerity to believe that I can effect impossibilities, I cannot fight a ship without men."

However, Chauncey was correct when he told Jones he needed more senior officers. Master Commandant Leonard was sent to Sackets Harbor to serve as captain of the *Madison*. However he was under arrest and ineligible to serve, his place being taken temporarily by Lieutenant Jesse Elliott who served in that capacity during the attacks on

York and Fort George. Elliott was replaced as captain on 10 July 1813 by 36 year old Master Commandant William Montgomery Crane just two days after Crane’s arrival at Sackets Harbor.

William Crane received his midshipman’s warrant in 1799, was appointed an acting lieutenant in 1803 and commissioned lieutenant in 1807. He was promoted to master commandant in March 1813. Before arriving at Sackets Harbor, Crane had served on board the frigates *United States*, *Chesapeake* and *President* and the brig *Vixen*. He commanded the schooner *Nautilus*, the brig *Argus* and served as temporary commandant of the Boston and New York navy yards.¹⁰⁷ He was an experienced and respected officer.



William Montgomery Crane

Along with Crane came the officers and crew of the frigate *John Adams*, which gave Chauncey the men he needed to man the almost complete frigate *General Pike*. Accordingly, on 10 July most of the crew of the *Madison* was transferred to the *General Pike* and replaced by the men from the *John Adams*.¹⁰⁸ The new crew is detailed in Table 6 on page 23.

Rank	Number	Rank	Number
Armorer	1	Marine Sergeant	1
Boatswain’s Mates	2	Master Commandant (Crane)	1
Boatswain (Knapp)	1	Master’s Mates (Larkin, Mackey, Shel???)	3
Boys	2	Midshipmen (Freeman, Lacey, Norton?, Potts, Shute, Stewart)	6
Carpenter (Simpson)	1	Ordinary Seamen	57
Carpenter’s Mates	5	Purser (Fitzgerald)	1
Carpenter’s Yeoman	1	Quarter Gunners	8
Cooper	1	Quartermasters	5
Gunner (Johnston)	1	Sailing Master (Lowe)	1
Lieutenants (Bullus, Babbitt, Finch, Macomber)	4	Sailmaker (Ware)	1
Marine Corporal	1	Seamen	88
Marine Privates	26	Surgeon (Campbell)	1
Marine Second Lieutenant (Boone)	1	Surgeon’s Mate (Salter)	1
		Total	221

Table 6 – Madison’s Crew as of 10 July 1813
Muster Rolls, NAUS, RG45, T829, roll 16 pp.64-75

Although new to the *Madison*, these men had served together on board the *John Adams* and required little if any time to adjust to their new vessel. Chauncey now had three purpose-built and well manned warships to augment his collection of small schooners. From the time he returned to Sackets Harbor after the capture of Fort George, Chauncey was concerned that his force was inferior to that of Commodore Yeo’s. Initially he informed Secretary Jones that while he had 14 vessels “of every description” compared to seven vessels and six gun boats belonging to the enemy, he was outgunned 106 to 82.¹⁰⁹

Before the arrival of the men from the *John Adams*, and perhaps even before the attack on York, the *Madison*'s armament was changed. Four of the 32-pound carronades were removed and replaced with 12-pound cannon. This would cost the *Madison* broadside weight but would enable her to fight at a greater distance than with her previous all-carronade armament.¹¹⁰

By mid-July, Chauncey had added the new frigate *General Pike* as well as the former British *Duke of Gloucester* captured at York, now rearmed and renamed *York*, but he had also credited the British with two more gunboats. In Chauncey's view that made the two squadrons equal in number of guns. Chauncey's estimate, as presented to the Navy Department, is shown in Table 7 on page 24, along with the actual force Yeo had available to meet Chauncey on the lake.

Chauncey assumed that the small British gunboats would be a part of Yeo's squadron when they were actually being used to escort bateaux convoys on the St. Lawrence River. The sloop *Mary Ann*, which Chauncey assumed was part of Yeo's force, was actually an unarmed merchant vessel. Offsetting this was the presence of the new 14-gun British brig *Lord Melville*, which Chauncey knew existed but for some reason did not include in his report.¹¹¹

American Squadron			British Squadron					
Name	Rig	Guns	According to Chauncey			Actual Force		
			Name	Rig	Guns	Name	Rig	Guns
<i>General Pike</i>	Ship	26	<i>Wolfe</i>	Ship	28	<i>Wolfe</i>	Ship	23
<i>Madison</i>	Ship	24	<i>Royal George</i>	Ship	26	<i>Royal George</i>	Ship	22
<i>Oneida</i>	Brig	18	<i>Earl of Moira</i>	Brig	18	<i>Earl of Moira</i>	Brig	16
13 Schooners	Schr	46	3 Schooners	Schr	30	<i>Lord Melville</i>	Brig	14
Total		114	<i>Mary Ann</i>	Sloop	4	<i>Lord Beresford</i>	Schr	12
			8 Gunboats		8	<i>Sir Sidney Smith</i>	Schr	14
			Total		114	Total		101

Table 7 – American and British Fleet Force Comparison, 1 August 1813
 AF, *Statement of Naval Forces on Lake Ontario*, M625 roll 76 frames 201-203
State of British and American Naval Forces before 10 August 1813, NAUK, ADM 1/2736

As for his own force, the *York* never sailed as part of Chauncey's squadron and the small one-gun dispatch schooner *Lady of the Lake* usually operated independently. Furthermore a week after Chauncey prepared his comparison, he reported to Secretary Jones that the *General Pike* now mounted 28 not 26 guns.¹¹² Adjusting for those changes made the actual gun ratio 113 for Chauncey and 101 for Yeo, close enough that the winner in a fight would be determined, not by firepower, but by the wind and weather, the skill of the commander, the training of the crews, and a bit of luck.

By mid-July, Chauncey was feeling the pressure from Secretary Jones and even the newspapers to finish the *General Pike*, get his squadron out on the lake and deal with Yeo. As was usual with Chauncey he had a ready excuse for remaining in port. On 19 July this was because

*The heavy rains which have prevailed for the last 3 weeks have retarded our operations considerably.*¹¹³

However, Chauncey reassured Secretary Jones that he would definitely sail the next day. He didn't. Two days later he informed Jones that he would leave Sackets Harbor "this evening or tomorrow morning" having been delayed "for the purpose of fitting my guns completely."¹¹⁴ On 22 July Chauncey finally sailed with most of his squadron, including the *Madison*.

Fighting the Royal Navy

Now finally at sea, Chauncey was anxious to accomplish something. His first attempt was to sail along the Canadian shore hoping to encounter Yeo's squadron, but saw nothing. He then proceeded in the *General Pike* along with Captain Crane's *Madison*, the *Oneida* and most of the schooners to Niagara, arriving there on the evening of 27 July.

At Niagara he took on board Colonel Winfield Scott and 250 soldiers and the next morning sailed for Burlington Bay to capture or destroy "a considerable deposit of provisions and stores" that the British had at that location. Again, "light winds and calms" delayed Chauncey. It took almost 36 hours, until the evening of 29 July, to sail less than 40 miles. There Chauncey found the British defenders were too numerous for his small landing force to handle so the squadron sailed on to York. There they landed unopposed and found "several hundred barrels of flour and provisions in the public store houses, five pieces of cannon, eleven boats, and a quantity of shot, shells, and other stores, all which were either destroyed or brought away." Chauncey's force then returned to Niagara arriving on 3 August.¹¹⁵

Chauncey and Brigadier General John Boyd planned to return to Burlington Bay with 1,500 troops on board to overwhelm the defenders and capture the stores but that idea was abandoned at daybreak on 7 August when the British squadron under Commodore Sir James Yeo appeared off Niagara. The *Madison* and the rest of Chauncey's squadron sailed to engage the enemy. That day Yeo attempted to close with the American squadron but, as a midshipman on board the *Madison* observed,

*Being within long shot the Com. fired 5 or 6 guns which they did not return but continued bearing down upon us. The Com. thunder struck (and no doubt frightened) at their coolness and determination bravely tacked ship and left them under pretence of endeavoring to get the weather gage.*¹¹⁶

During the maneuvers, Yeo observed that "the *Madison* is about the size of the *Wolfe* sails well & is managed much better than the *Pike*."¹¹⁷

About midnight a sudden violent squall upset and sank the schooners *Hamilton* and *Scourge*. The following day the two squadrons maneuvered for advantage but night fell without an action. At sunrise Chauncey formed his squadron into two columns. That evening the two forces came together and at 11 P.M. "the rear of our line opened his fire upon the Enemy — in about 15 minutes the fire became general from the weather line which was returned from the enemy."¹¹⁸

While both sides were firing at each other but too far apart to do much damage in the dark, the schooners *Julia* and *Growler* for some reason turned to port instead of starboard, sailed into the midst of the British force and were captured.

The same midshipman who commented on Chauncey's action on 7 August, now observed that

*We kept closing, two of our schooners were in the midst of the enemy's fleet when the Com. wore ship and left the enemy!*¹¹⁹

Now having lost four of his schooners without any benefit to the American cause, Chauncey sent two of the remaining schooners into Niagara and took the rest, including the *Madison* which had not a single day's provisions left on board, back to Sackets Harbor, arriving on 13 August.¹²⁰

In his report to Secretary Jones, while admitting that the loss of the schooners, particularly the *Julia* and *Growler*, was "mortifying in the extreme," his experience convinced him that "he [Yeo] has no intention of engaging us except he can get decidedly the advantage of wind and weather and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron he can always avoid an action." Once again, Chauncey concluded by mixing optimistic plans with a pessimistic view of the situation: "I hope that it will be my turn next and altho' inferior in point of force— I feel very confident of success."

Chauncey's tactics on this occasion are questionable at best. He formed his squadron into two columns some 600 yards apart with the strongest part of his force, the *General Pike*, *Madison* and *Oneida* in the starboard column away from the British. Chauncey's plan, as he reported to Secretary Jones, was to use the port column schooners as bait to encourage the British to close with them. As shown in Diagram 1, when that happened, those schooners were to "pass through the intervals and form to leeward" of Chauncey's strongest ships who would then engage and defeat the enemy at close range. It did not work out as he expected:

At half past 11 the weather line bore up and passed to the leeward except the Growler and Julia which soon after tacked to the southward, which brought the enemy between them and me.

This gives the impression that the schooner column executed a turn on its own when in fact it was ordered by Chauncey, even though the British were still some distance away. After seeing the result, Chauncey confirmed the *Madison*'s midshipman's observation by reporting that he


*Edged away two points to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage but to lead him from the Growler and Julia.*¹²¹

Yeo, however, failed to act as Chauncey wished. As Yeo himself simply described it,

*On coming up with the Madison & Pike they put before the wind made sail firing their stern chase guns ... I therefore made sail between them and the two schooners to windward...*¹²²

The British kept their distance, gobbled up the *Julia* and *Growler* and, having had the best of the action, disappeared into the night. Throughout, Chauncey left the initiative to

the British. Instead of steering towards Yeo’s squadron, forcing him to either fight or edge away himself, Chauncey waited for the British to make a mistake. That never happened. Furthermore, expecting that all of the port column schooners would pass through the starboard column at night without incident was rather optimistic. Had the *Julia* and *Growler* turned the right way the result might easily have been a collision in the dark between the *Growler* and the *Madison*.



Once at Sackets Harbor, Chauncey lost no time in taking on board five weeks worth of provisions and the squadron sailed again that same day for Niagara, arriving on 16 August. For the next three days the American and British squadrons maneuvered on the lake, each trying to gain the

advantage. Their efforts were hampered by gale force winds that continued until Chauncey was forced back to Sackets Harbor on 19 August. All the vessels, including the *Madison*, had suffered significant storm damage “in spars cables or anchors.”¹²³

In addition to the time needed to repair the storm damage, Chauncey decided to wait until his new large schooner *Sylph* was ready for service. This kept the *Madison* anchored and idle for two weeks.¹²⁴

At the end of August Commodore Chauncey’s squadron, including the *Madison* and the brand new *Sylph*, sailed from Sackets Harbor bound for Niagara. Chauncey, recognizing the poor sailing characteristics of the small schooners and the *Oneida*, began to have those vessels towed by the *General Pike*, *Madison* and *Sylph* as needed to improve his squadron’s overall performance.¹²⁵ The *Sylph*, however, was not yet fully equipped. Some of these deficiencies were taken care of while at sea from the other vessels in the squadron, the *Madison* providing 12 cutlasses and a number of pistols.¹²⁶

On 7 September, while anchored at the mouth of the Niagara River, Chauncey sighted the British squadron approaching. The squadron immediately sailed in pursuit. A four day chase then ensued with a combination of light winds and the poor sailing of the *Oneida* and the small schooners preventing the Americans from getting any closer than a mile from the British.

Finally, on 11 September, the British squadron found itself becalmed off the mouth of the Genesee River while Chauncey's squadron still had a light westerly wind. Taking advantage of the situation, the American squadron got close enough to open fire with their cannon. The British squadron, armed primarily with short range carronades, was



The Madison in action with the British off the Genesee River, 11 September 1813. Detail from a drawing by participant Midshipman Peter Spicer

unable to effectively reply. Just when the British began to receive some serious damage, the wind increased allowing Yeo's squadron to escape. The next day the British "succeeded in getting into Amherst Bay which is so little known to our pilots and said to be full of shoals that they are not willing to take me in there."¹²⁷

Once again a promising opportunity was lost, primarily due to the presence of "our heavy sailing schooners."¹²⁸ Chauncey persisted in his belief that he could not risk an engagement with the British without those schooners present. The addition of the *Sylph* did allow him to reduce their number, but as the squadron's speed and maneuverability was limited by the presence of even one small schooner, that reduction was not of much help, as Chauncey reported to Secretary Jones:

*This ship, the Madison, and the Sylph has each a schooner constantly in tow yet the others can not sail as fast as the enemies squadron which gives him decidedly the advantage.*¹²⁹

The American squadron, including the *Madison*, blockaded the British until 17 September when Yeo succeeded in reaching Kingston and Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor to meet with Secretary of War John Armstrong. Chauncey left Sackets Harbor the next morning and sailed to Niagara to meet with General James Wilkinson, who was arranging to transport his army to Sackets Harbor in a fleet of small boats. Owing to "continual head winds" the passage was slow. It took six days for Chauncey to reach Niagara.¹³⁰

The *Madison* remained at anchor in the Niagara River until the evening of 27 September. The previous day Chauncey received word that Yeo's squadron was at York but unfavorable winds kept the squadron at Niagara. When the two forces finally met, the American squadron was east of the British with a near gale-force easterly wind. For the first time in the war the British squadron was in a very bad tactical situation. While the Americans had the weather gauge, the British lacked maneuvering room and were being blown towards the Canadian shore.

Once again Chauncey lost an opportunity. For two hours the *General Pike* engaged Yeo's flagship the *Wolfe* with the British vessel receiving serious damage. Despite that, "the enemy however keeping dead before the wind was enabled to out-sail most of our squadron." Only the *General Pike* really got into the fight. The other vessels were never heavily engaged, the *Madison* suffering no damage or casualties while "keeping up a heavy fire upon the enemy."¹³¹ One reason for the poor sailing was that the Americans continued towing their small schooners, including the *Madison* which was towing the *Fair American*.

When the British managed to anchor at the Head of the Lake, Chauncey “very reluctantly relinquished the pursuit of a beaten enemy” because, as he reported to Secretary Jones,

*I should be obliged to anchor also, and altho' we might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was that we should go on shore also-he amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies.*¹³²

Given the situation and Chauncey’s repeated unwillingness to take any kind of risk, he found it easy to reiterate to Jones that he

*Without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then presenting itself of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my country.*¹³³

This affair cost the *General Pike* four men killed and 23 wounded with nothing to show for it. While Chauncey did not know it, he had just lost his last (and best) chance to defeat the British squadron on Lake Ontario.

Chauncey then ordered the *Madison* and the rest of the squadron back to the mouth of the Niagara River so he could “communicate with General Wilkinson to ascertain when he meant to move with the army.” On 1 October Chauncey anchored off Four Mile Creek east of Fort Niagara and found Wilkinson’s men embarking in small boats preparing to sail along the south and east coasts of Lake Ontario to Sackets Harbor and Grenadier Island.¹³⁴ Chauncey agreed to sail immediately to locate and prevent the British from interfering with Wilkinson’s movements.

Expecting Yeo’s squadron to be in Burlington Bay, Chauncey dispatched the schooner *Lady of the Lake* to check. The schooner did so but the British had departed. The squadron, including the *Madison*, then joined the *Lady of the Lake* in Burlington Bay.¹³⁵ Believing that the British had sailed east and would be a danger to Wilkinson’s boat flotilla, Chauncey then sailed east in pursuit.

On 5 October Chauncey sighted a number of sails to the east, off the Ducks Islands. He originally thought he had caught up with Yeo’s squadron but it did not take long to realize he had actually caught a British troop convoy sailing unescorted from York to Kingston. Chauncey turned over command of the main part of the squadron to Captain Crane in the *Madison* and went ahead in the *General Pike*, *Lady of the Lake* and *Sylph*.¹³⁶ Five of the seven vessels in the convoy were captured, one was burned by her crew and only one schooner managed to escape in the dark. Two of those captured were the former *Julia* and *Growler*. Now burdened with prizes and prisoners of war, the squadron returned to Sackets Harbor in 6 October.¹³⁷

During this time, life on board the *Madison* was extremely stressful. The lack of money and the high cost of almost everything at Sackets Harbor was very discouraging. One midshipman on board the *Madison* wrote to his uncle that

*I am almost fatigued to death. Up at all hours and health not very good withall. We can get no money from our pursers. Our living is very expensive. ... It is discouraging to live thus. Enduring the greatest fatigue and hardships perhaps ruining my constitution for \$19 pr month. And even that pitiful sum in the manner paid, is not equal to \$10.*¹³⁸

The “manner paid” probably referred to Treasury Notes, a loan instrument acting as paper money. These notes were accepted at Sackets Harbor only with difficulty and then at a hefty discount from their face value.

The *Madison* remained at Sackets Harbor until the squadron sailed again on 16 October for the mouth of the Genesee River to collect Colonel Winfield Scott and his men. On the way Chauncey received word that changed his course. He was now asked by Secretary of War John Armstrong to protect Wilkinson's army as it collected on Grenadier Island.¹³⁹

Although Chauncey hoped this protection would take only a few days, it required almost three weeks. During this time the *Madison* travelled with the squadron as it anchored in various places at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, including the Ducks Islands, Grenadier Island and Stoney Island.¹⁴⁰ Finally, on 2 November, with Wilkinson's army gathering at French Creek¹⁴¹ the *Madison* and the rest of the squadron entered the St. Lawrence River. The *Madison* remained in the river for two days with only a shallow channel in the Thousand Islands separating her from the British squadron. After Yeo returned to Kingston and with Wilkinson's force well down the St. Lawrence River, Chauncey took his squadron first to Carleton Island, then to Gravelly Point¹⁴² and finally back to Sackets Harbor on 11 November 1813.¹⁴³ The *Madison* and the squadron had sailed the eastern end of Lake Ontario for almost a month and accomplished very little. They certainly did not prevent British Captain William Howe Mulcaster from taking his gunboat flotilla down the St. Lawrence River where it effectively annoyed Wilkinson's army and was one factor in the American defeat at Crysler's farm.

Once at Sackets Harbor, Chauncey was asked to sail the squadron to Niagara to bring an army brigade to Sackets Harbor. The lateness of the season and the real possibility of encountering very bad weather made Chauncey reluctant to make the trip. Nevertheless, he left for Niagara on 13 November, arriving the next evening without incident. The same was not true for the return trip. Major General William Henry Harrison and about 1,100 troops were on board the squadron by 16 November. They sailed that day but gale force winds from the east scattered the squadron and kept the individual vessels at the western end of Lake Ontario. On 15 November, Commodore Chauncey took the *General Pike* north leaving the rest of the squadron under the command of Captain Crane in the *Madison*.¹⁴⁴

The weather forced the *Madison* to return to Niagara for shelter, fortunately "with but little injury" from the storm. She remained at Niagara along with the schooners *Fair American* and *Governor Tompkins* when the rest of the squadron returned to Sackets Harbor. The *Madison* eventually arrived safely at Sackets Harbor on 23 November.¹⁴⁵

It was now clear to Chauncey that "the season is too far advanced for any further operations upon the lake."¹⁴⁶ On 2 December, Chauncey positioned his squadron at their winter moorings as the *Madison* prepared to spend her second winter at Sackets Harbor. Chauncey's plan paid careful attention to defense:

*The fleet is moored in two lines at right angles with each other, so that each line is calculated to support the other and also to afford protection to the block houses, situated on the two sides of the harbor.*¹⁴⁷

That "same night the harbor and bay froze over so that our people walked on shore from the ships."¹⁴⁸

With the prospect of a long cold winter at hand, and "under the impression, that the service [at Sackets Harbor] would prove short and temporary" the *Madison*'s officers and crew asked Secretary Jones for permission to return to the *John Adams* at New York

City, even if that was just for the winter. Captain Crane wrote Secretary Jones “that all will cheerfully return to this station in the spring, provided our services are deemed necessary.” Secretary Jones replied that he was unable to grant the request as circumstances continued to require their presence at Sackets Harbor and the *John Adams* was gone. She had been sent on a diplomatic mission to Sweden.¹⁴⁹ Crane did not receive Jones’ reply until 3 February 1814 and it clearly upset him. He replied to Jones that “I do not view the lakes as a choice service” but he considered it his duty to go where he was ordered. His crew, however, was another matter. Crane reported that

I have made every human effort to induce my crew to rest satisfied, but in vain, they yet believe they are not bound to serve off the Atlantic, in consequence of their entering for a vessel on that station — the dreadful mortality amongst them has disheartened the remainder of the ships company, and they avail themselves of every opportunity to desert.¹⁵⁰

This sentiment was common amongst all the crews at Sackets Harbor that winter and generally for the reasons stated. By the end of 1813 conditions at Sackets Harbor were so widely known that very few officers or seamen volunteered to serve on Lake Ontario.

Winter and Spring 1814

During the winter of 1813-1814, the *Madison*, like the other vessels in Chauncey’s squadron, faced the problem of providing provisions for the crew. Most of the meat issued to the seamen that winter was fresh, not salted. In January 1814 the *Madison* received 6,915 pounds of fresh beef and an additional 4,827 pounds came on board during February, all obtained locally through the firm of Pardee & Conklin at a cost of a bit over 7.4 cents per pound.¹⁵¹ Presumably the cold temperatures preserved the meat long enough for it to be eaten. From Chauncey’s accounts it appears that fresh beef deliveries ceased with the warmer weather but resumed again in the fall, when 4,660 pounds were eaten by the *Madison*’s crew during November 1814, obtained this time from the firm of Smith & Pardee at the reduced cost of six cents per pound.¹⁵²

In addition to provisions, the officers and men of the squadron had not been paid for many months and the lack of funds was causing discontent. Even Christmas celebrations were possible only because of the benevolence of the commodore:

The Commodore has given the men one dollar a piece to celebrate Christmas and there are not five officers who have money sufficient to take their letters from the Post Office.¹⁵³

This situation would become much worse in 1814.

The health of the crew was also a problem. Winter at Sackets Harbor often saw heavy snow and daytime temperatures as low as minus 25°F. In mid-December Chauncey reported that

*The crews of the different vessels have become extremely sickly particularly the *Madison* — the deaths from that ship for the last twenty days have averaged nearly one a day.¹⁵⁴*

Chauncey attributed this to the harsh climate at Sackets Harbor. Deaths were frequent despite the best efforts of the squadron’s surgeons:

The men have every thing that this place can afford to make them comfortable, yet the very best constitutions sink under the effects of the climate for notwithstanding the best medical attendance they frequently die after two or three days sickness — It is really disheartening to see so many fine fellows sinking under disease with scarcely a possibility of saving them.¹⁵⁵

Three months later the situation on board the *Madison* had not improved. That vessel

*Has never had since November last less than one third of her crew sick and in five months she has lost by deaths 41 men — All new men that arrive on the station become sickly and in the seasoning that they are obliged to undergo many of them die.*¹⁵⁶

Chauncey could only hope that with the arrival of spring and warmer weather his squadron's health, especially that of the crew of the *Madison*, would improve.

During the winter, many of the vessels in the squadron needed minor repairs and some men were often provided from other vessels to speed the work. On 19 February 1814, one of the *Sylph*'s carpenters spent the day on board the *Madison* for that reason.¹⁵⁷ Two weeks later the *Sylph* also provided men to assist the *Madison*'s crew in hauling wood.¹⁵⁸

A common winter problem, when long periods of time were spent with little to do and the shore close by, was desertion and the *Madison* was not exempt. Young Ordinary Seaman Thomas Johnson had volunteered for the lakes but "after seeing his shipmates falling off and dying" became disheartened. On 5 December 1813 he deserted. He was captured and court martialed on 20 January 1814 where he pled guilty to the charge, claiming he "intended to give himself up to the first naval officer on the Atlantic." That day the court was in no mood for leniency. Even after considering Johnson's "youth & inexperience" he was sentenced to

*Receive one hundred lashes on his bare back with a cat of nine tails; to be proportioned alongside the General Pike, Madison, Sylph and Oneida, at such time as the Commanding Naval Officer shall direct. And that the expenses of his apprehension be charged to his account and deducted from his pay.*¹⁵⁹

Chauncey being absent, the *Madison*'s captain, Master Commandant William Crane ordered the sentence to be carried out five days later.¹⁶⁰

With Chauncey absent in New York City, Washington and Philadelphia from 26 December 1813 to 23 February 1814, William Crane acquired responsibility for the squadron and Sackets Harbor's naval defenses in addition to his duties as captain of the *Madison*. A major effort on shore was the completion of forts Tompkins and Chauncey. However, Crane informed Chauncey that

*This latter work may cost something as lawyer Camp threatens to prosecute me for cutting timber off his land to defend his house and the town.*¹⁶¹

For most of the war, the British had an extensive espionage network in place around Sackets Harbor. Information about activities there were received regularly at Kingston, both from residents who were paid to deliver it as well as by deserters who offered it voluntarily. One curious case involved Robert Christie. Christie appears on the *Madison*'s June 1814 pay roll as a seaman, arriving on board in January 1814 and leaving on 23 March 1814 but with no reason given for his departure nor any destination.¹⁶² The following day a Robert Christie, reportedly a Canadian resident caught in the United States by the outbreak of war and since working at Sackets Harbor, appeared in Kingston and gave a very detailed description of the status of the fleet and the shipbuilding activities at Sackets Harbor. In his deposition he claimed he was close enough to Commodore Chauncey to overhear conversations between him and Captain Crane.¹⁶³ Was this the same man who left the *Madison* the day before? While it appears likely, conclusive evidence is lacking.

After his return to Sackets Harbor, and as spring approached, it was time for Chauncey to obtain crews for the four new vessels that would be added to the squadron that year: the frigates *Superior* and *Mohawk* and the brigs *Jefferson* and *Jones*. Nearly 1,000 additional men would be needed and Secretary Jones believed they could be obtained by recruiting or by men volunteering from the gunboats.¹⁶⁴ Chauncey, however, knew that recruiting alone would not obtain them, nor was it likely that enough men would volunteer from the gunboat flotillas to meet the need. The men would have to come from the crews of the warships on the Atlantic and he applied to Secretary Jones to have that done.¹⁶⁵ In the event, most of the additional men required on Lake Ontario in 1814 were obtained by transferring men from the Atlantic and not from recruiting efforts or volunteers.

In early June 1814 Chauncey received the pleasant news that Captain John Smith and the entire crew of the frigate *Congress* were on their way from Portsmouth, New Hampshire to Sackets Harbor.¹⁶⁶ Chauncey planned to use those men to man the new frigate *Mohawk* retaining Smith as their captain.¹⁶⁷ The men arrived but Captain Smith did not. He got as far as Albany before he became too ill to continue and returned to New York City where he notified Secretary Jones. Jones, in turn, notified Chauncey.¹⁶⁸ This caused Chauncey to revise his plan for manning his squadron.

Captain Jacob Jones and his crew would move from the *General Pike* to the *Mohawk*. Master Commandant William Crane and his crew would then move from the *Madison* to the *General Pike* and the men from the *Congress* would go on board the *Madison*.¹⁶⁹ Chauncey, however, now needed a new captain for the *Madison*. The man he chose was 30 year old Master Commandant Edward C. Trenchard.

Trenchard became a midshipman in 1800, an acting lieutenant in 1805, received his lieutenants commission in 1807 and was promoted to master commandant in July 1813. An experienced officer, before arriving at Sackets Harbor he had served on board the frigates *Adams*, *Constitution*, *Constellation* and *President* and the brig *Argus*. He commanded gunboats 32 and 43 and the schooner *Alert*. After his arrival at Sackets Harbor on 11 June 1813, and before his promotion to master commandant, he commanded the schooner *York* (ex-*Duke of Gloucester*).¹⁷⁰ This, however, was not the whole story.



In August 1813, Chauncey ordered Trenchard back to New York City because of the “ill state of your health” and to “sooth him” told Trenchard that after his health was restored to report to Samuel Evans at the New York Navy Yard and to assist Evans in forwarding stores to Sackets Harbor. While true, the real situation was a bit more dramatic. In a letter to Jones marked “Private” Chauncey explained:

[My] real object was to get him amongst his friends before he did a violence to himself. He has made several attempts upon his life and while in sight of the enemy I was obliged to take him out of his vessel and confine him to this ship in a *Strait Jacket* and even from there he escaped his keepers and jumped overboard and we had great difficulty in saving him — he is at times perfectly sane, but at other times as wild as a mad man.¹⁷¹

As Chauncey accurately described it, Trenchard was “not in a state to command a public vessel at this time.” In a later century he would be considered mentally ill and not in a

state to command a public vessel at any time. However, this was 1813 and after six months, when Trenchard appeared to have recovered his “health,” the Navy Department ordered him back to Sackets Harbor, where he arrived on 15 May.¹⁷²

At that time Chauncey did not have a suitable ship available for him to command so he assigned Trenchard to supervise the navy yard and the construction of the 15 gunboats or armed barges being built at Sackets Harbor. Given his experience the year before, it is likely that Chauncey, who had not requested Trenchard’s return, was relieved to find an excuse not to have Trenchard commanding one of his warships.

This changed when Captain Smith became ill, which prompted the mass movements of captains and crews detailed above. On 10 July 1814 Edward Trenchard became captain of the *Madison*.¹⁷³

Most of the *Madison*’s new crew was made up from the men sent to Sackets Harbor from the frigate *Congress*. These men are included in the list shown in Table 8 on page 36.

Rearming

That spring, the 32 pound carronades, which had armed the *Madison* for the past year, were now needed to arm the spar (top) deck of the new frigate *Superior*. Chauncey ordered Navy Agent John Bullus to send 22, 18-pound cannon from New York City to replace them, justifying this change to Secretary Jones by now claiming that “the



A model of the brig Oneida showing its as-designed (but never mounted) bow pivot gun. Although this is a 32 pound cannon not an 18, the Madison’s pivot gun would have looked similar. Model at the Sackets Harbor Battlefield State Historic Site, Sackets Harbor, NY; photograph by the author.

Madison is best calculated for long guns than short,” a questionable opinion at best. Since an 18 pound cannon weighed much more than a 32 pound carronade, that change would add over 25 tons of weight to the *Madison*’s deck.¹⁷⁴ This would raise her center of gravity, reducing both her metacentric height and her stability.

Chauncey recognized this problem and informed Jones that

*I have requested him [Bullus] to endeavour to effect a change with the commanding officer on Governors Island where there are some very light 18 pdrs belonging to the War Department — they can be replaced with longer guns from the Navy Yard.*¹⁷⁵

The cannon arrived but apparently after mounting all 22 the extra top weight proved excessive. A mid-July 1814 report has the *Madison* armed with only 14, 18 pound cannon retaining eight of the original 32-pound carronades as broadside guns plus an 18 pound cannon mounted on a pivot mount on a newly-built forecastle deck.¹⁷⁶

Unlike a broadside gun, a pivot mounting allowed a cannon to be fired in (theoretically) any direction independent of the course the ship was steering. The potential advantage of such a mounting during a naval battle was considerable. However, in actual practice the presence of masts, rigging, bowsprit, boats and deck structures limited a bow-mounted

pivot gun to firing at an enemy only within about a 45-degree angle relative to each side of the ship. Also, that much extra weight so far forward would cause the *Madison*'s bow to "plow" into the water in a heavy sea making the deck and the space below it very wet and the vessel harder to handle. The brig *Oneida*'s as-designed 32 pound pivot gun was never actually installed for that reason.

Furthermore, the addition of a forecastle deck to mount the pivot gun would have reduced the number of broadside gun ports by one on each side. Chauncey's original plan to mount 24 carronades plus two long 9 pounders required the *Madison* to be built with 13 gun ports a side. Installing the pivot gun would have reduced that to 12 ports. However post-war reports have the *Madison* pierced for only 22 guns, or 11 guns per side with no mention of a pivot gun.¹⁷⁷ Consequently there is some reason to believe that the *Madison*'s pivot gun was not on board for long, if it was ever on board at all. The brigs *Jefferson* and *Jones* were each built with a bow pivot gun, but those guns were removed before they sailed with Chauncey's squadron in August 1814.

Chauncey originally informed Secretary Jones and the army that he expected his squadron to be ready to sail for the first time that year about the first of July. The actual sailing date turned out to be the first of August. This delay, due to problems completing the frigate *Mohawk*, Chauncey's two-week illness, and his unwillingness to allow his second in command, Captain Jacob Jones, to sail without him while he was ill, almost caused Chauncey to be replaced by Captain Stephen Decatur. The delay also caused a major disagreement over priorities between Chauncey and the army on the Niagara Frontier. When he sailed, Chauncey made it clear to everyone that his focus that year was to be solely on the British Lake Ontario squadron. He would be wherever Yeo's squadron was and remain there until he had defeated them. The army would have to fend for itself. This led to an acrimonious exchange of letters between Chauncey and Major General Jacob Brown accusing Chauncey of wrecking the army's 1814 campaign on the Niagara Frontier. Most of these letters appeared in the newspapers to the considerable embarrassment of the Navy Department.

While the squadron was waiting for Chauncey to recover from his illness, the *Madison* made occasional short day trips out on the lake near Sackets Harbor, often in company with other vessels in the squadron, to exercise the crew. On 8 June the *Madison* went to sea for the first time that year. Departing Sackets Harbor at 9 a.m. that morning along with the *Jefferson*, *General Pike*, *Sylph* and *Oneida*, she spent five hours maneuvering on Lake Ontario, returning to Sackets Harbor at 2:30 p.m.¹⁷⁸ Apparently her performance during this exercise was satisfactory as no subsequent changes were made to her configuration or armament. Another short voyage took place on 24 July in company with the *Oneida*. This was repeated the next day in company with the *Mohawk*, *Jefferson*, *Sylph* and *Oneida*.¹⁷⁹

Although supposedly safely at anchor, the *Madison* was not completely secure. On 23 June a northeast gale caused the frigate *Superior*, moored nearby, to drag her anchors and collide with the *Madison*, carrying away her flying jib boom.¹⁸⁰ The bed of Black River Bay outside the harbor is mostly rock covered with a layer of silt and holding is very poor. This was apparently not realized at the time.

Six days later, while the *Madison* was being “heaved” (inclined) to have her bottom cleaned, things got out of control and “hove her over” onto her side. Crews from other ships, including the new frigate *Superior*, were dispatched and used purchases (a form of block and tackle) to right her.¹⁸¹ The *Madison* apparently suffered no permanent damage from the experience.

Operations in 1814

True to his word, Chauncey’s entire squadron made only one visit to Niagara that year. On 5 August, as the squadron approached Niagara, the Royal Navy brig *Magnet* was seen along the shore near Twelve Mile Creek steering for the mouth of the Niagara River.¹⁸² Facing a headwind, the *Magnet*’s progress was slow and that gave Chauncey an opportunity to intercept her. As the *Sylph* and *Lady of the Lake* approached, the *Magnet*’s captain ran her on shore and set fire to her. Loaded with barrels of gunpowder, she later exploded, denying Chauncey an easy prize.¹⁸³

Rank	Number	Rank	Number
Acting Boatswain (Jackson)	1	Master at Arms	1
Acting Gunner (Hose)	1	Master Commandant (Trenchard)	1
Boatswain’s Mates	2	Master’s Mate (Lowe)	1
Boatswain’s Yeoman	1	Midshipmen (Berry, Bowyer, Conyngham, Fitzhugh, Latimer, Lee, Lord, McCauley, Young)	9
Boys	10	Ordinary Seamen	68
Carpenter (DeMerritt)	1	Purser (Bourne)	1
Carpenter’s Yeoman	1	Quarter Gunners	7
Cook	1	Quartermasters	6
Cooper	1	Sailing Master (Caldwell)	1
Gunner’s Yeoman	1	Sailmaker’s Mate	1
Lieutenants (Cocke, Macomber, McCawley, Porter)	4	Seamen	51
Marine Corporal	1	Surgeon (Washington)	1
Marine Privates	9	Surgeon’s Mate (Johnson)	1
Marine Sergeant	1	Total	184

Table 8 – *Madison*’s Crew as of August 1814
Crew Lists. NAUS. RG45. T829. roll 16 pp.78-84

Afterwards, fearing for the “weakness of Sacketts Harbour” Chauncey and the *Madison* left Niagara on the evening of 7 August arriving off Kingston two days later.

Afterwards, and for the rest of August and September, the *Madison* joined the *Superior*, *Mohawk* and *General Pike* in blockading Yeo’s squadron in Kingston. Anchored off the Ducks Islands, the *Madison* and the other three ships were ideally placed to intercept any attempt by the British to leave Kingston, either to challenge Chauncey to a fight or to slip past them with supplies and reinforcements for the British army on the Niagara peninsula.

Chauncey sent his four brigs on separate service to the west to interdict the British cross-lake supply routes to York and Burlington Bay. Chauncey also hoped that by reducing his blockading force he could entice the British squadron to come out and fight as they would have superior numbers. The British, however, would still have been inferior in firepower. The *Superior*, classed as a frigate but with the cannon armament of a ship of

the line, was a good match for any two of Yeo's vessels. Wisely recognizing that fact, Commodore Yeo kept his ships safely at anchor in Kingston Harbor until his own (real) ship of the line, the 102-gun *Saint Lawrence*, was ready for sea in October.

For most of two months the *Madison* alternated between sitting at anchor off the Ducks Islands waiting in vain for Yeo to appear, sailing past Kingston with the squadron hoping to goad Yeo to come out and fight, and making brief trips back to Sackets Harbor to resupply, send sick crewmen to the naval hospital, land seamen whose terms of service had expired, return recovered men and a few replacements, and collect the mail. Lack of men was a constant concern for both Commodore Chauncey and Captain Trenchard.

Earlier that year, Chauncey had dispatched Lieutenant Walter Stewart to New York City to recruit men for service on Lake Ontario.¹⁸⁴ When the crew of the frigate *Essex*, taken as prisoners of war after losing their ship to the British in the Pacific, returned after being exchanged, many signed on with Stewart. That changed when Navy Secretary Jones ordered David Porter, former captain of the *Essex*, "to repair to Washington with as many of the crew of the late U. States Frigate Essex as can be collected." Porter then ordered Stewart to deliver to him "the Crew of the Essex you have entered for Lake Ontario." At least sixty prime seamen were lost to Chauncey. As Chauncey remarked to Secretary Jones, "Those few men would have been a great acquisition to us in our present state"¹⁸⁵

Consequently his manpower continued to be steadily reduced by illness, death from disease and the expiration of the seamen's enlistment terms:

*Our mens' time expire about as fast as we receive recruits from Philadelphia and New York*¹⁸⁶

This was a problem for all the ships in Chauncey's squadron, not just the *Madison*.

In early September, after almost a month of waiting, Chauncey was forced to conclude that there was little chance of enticing Yeo's squadron to come out of Kingston to offer him battle, "and no opportunity offering to attack him in his present position."¹⁸⁷ The *Superior*, *Mohawk*, *General Pike* and *Madison* remained stationed off the Ducks Islands waiting for something to happen, periodically sailing past Kingston in full view of the enemy to annoy him. What else could Chauncey do?

The monotony of blockade was finally relieved when Chauncey's squadron transported two brigades of Major General George Izard's army from Sackets Harbor to the mouth of the Genesee River, to march from there to Niagara to reinforce Major General Jacob Brown. Chauncey had received Izard's request on 21 August. Chauncey informed Secretary Jones that he would comply, and planned to use the 15 armed barges being completed to aid in the transport, but that "we shall not have either officers or men for them." Chauncey was also concerned with keeping his four major warships, including the *Madison*, well manned as

*If the Enemy should determine to meet us without his large ship, we must be prepared to meet picked crews.*¹⁸⁸

Chauncey, however, did not know when Izard's force would be ready. On 26 August, Izard wrote that he hoped his 4,000 men would arrive at Sackets Harbor by 13 September.¹⁸⁹ This letter Chauncey did not receive for two weeks. When it arrived, Chauncey assured Izard that his fleet would be ready by that time.¹⁹⁰ Izard's reply was that he hoped to be able to embark his troops on board the squadron on 16 September

allowing a day after arrival at Sackets Harbor for them to recover from their suffering caused by the “badness of the roads and inclemency of the weather.”¹⁹¹

While waiting for Izard’s army to arrive, Chauncey made what would be his last major effort to entice Yeo to come out and fight. On 11 September with

*The wind from the northward a fine breeze and a clear day, I ... beat with the four ships close in with Kingston, hove too and hoisted our colours. The enemy shewed his colours and sprung his ships in line to receive us, but evinced no disposition to come out altho superior.*¹⁹²

Yeo, knowing his 102-gun ship-of-the-line *Saint Lawrence* was only weeks from being ready for sea, saw nothing to be gained by risking his force at that time. It must have been annoying to the British but that was the only advantage the Americans gained from the effort.

That night and the following day the wind “increased to a severe gale attended with thick weather and heavy rain.” This forced Chauncey out into the lake where his four ships remained until 15 September “under reefed foresail, and close reefed main topsail.” Chauncey later reported that the vessels, including the *Madison*, “behaved uncommonly well in the late gale, they are stiff and very fine sea boats and bore their mettle as well as any ships I have ever been in.”¹⁹³

The squadron returned to Sackets Harbor on 17 September, expecting to embark General Izard’s troops the next morning but a heavy gale sprang up which delayed embarking the troops until the 19th and sailing until the 21st. At 8 a.m. that morning Chauncey’s entire squadron, including the *Madison*, sailed for the mouth of the Genesee River where they arrived the following morning, anchored about a mile and a half offshore, hoisted out the boats and landed 3,000 troops – all the squadron had room for. During the landing the *Jones* “borrowed a batteau” from the *Madison* “to assist in disembarking.”¹⁹⁴ By 7 p.m. on the 23rd all the troops were on shore and an hour later Chauncey’s squadron, including the *Madison*, sailed east and anchored the next day off Stoney Island. After a few days close to Sackets Harbor, by 28 September the squadron was back off the Ducks Islands, blockading Kingston.

Finally, on 8 October 1814, Chauncey and his squadron returned to Sackets Harbor for the last time that year. On 5 October the British had the *St. Lawrence* ready for sea and Chauncey was anticipating an attack on Sackets Harbor at any time. The next two weeks were spent increasing the harbor’s defenses. Chauncey had Captain Trenchard position the *Madison* in Black River Bay such that its guns would be as effective as possible in defending the harbor. With that accomplished, Trenchard and his crew awaited the British attack. It never came.

On 27 October 1814, Captain Trenchard recommended an indefinite furlough be granted to Lieutenant Robert M. Rose, who had joined the *Madison* the previous July from the frigate *Congress* and whose father had recently died. This was approved by Commodore Chauncey.¹⁹⁵ That same day Chauncey applied to Secretary Jones for permission to convene a court martial to try sundry offenders, one of whom was a boatswain’s mate from the *Madison*, Peter Jenkins.¹⁹⁶ Jenkins attempted to desert on 19 October but was quickly spotted and arrested by Lieutenant William King of the U. S. Artillery.¹⁹⁷

Lieutenant Rose's was the first of a number of such requests which, by now, were commonplace at Sackets Harbor at the start of each winter season. On 28 October, the *Madison's* sailing master, William M. Caldwell, asked to be transferred back to the frigate *Congress* at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. His request was granted and he left Sackets Harbor on 15 December.¹⁹⁸ On 13 November, the *Madison's* first lieutenant, John Porter, requested and received permission from Captain Trenchard to apply for the command of one of the schooners reportedly being approved by Congress to be built on the Atlantic as commerce raisers.¹⁹⁹ Porter was not alone, as Chauncey informed Secretary Jones:

*The bill which is now pending before Congress authorizing the president to build or purchase twenty schooners has set all the lieutenants on this station crazy — they are all determined to have commands and the Department will be inundated with applications.*²⁰⁰

Chauncey recommended that Secretary Jones keep in mind the “inconvenience and injury the service would sustain by granting their requests” especially because “by removing all the senior lieutenants the ships would be left with very young and inefficient officers.”²⁰¹

By the beginning of 1815, the *Madison* had lost at least two of her lieutenants and her sailing master to transfers or furloughs. Illness also took its toll as Chauncey informed the Navy Department:

*The Madison has been so weakened by these means as to be left in charge of a midshipman, every officer of a higher grade having left the station, either by an order from the Department or by a sick ticket.*²⁰²

Furthermore, the *Madison's* purser, Benjamin Bourne, was under orders to report to the Atlantic as purser of the *Peacock*. As this involved the *Oneida* as well, Chauncey asked that a replacement be provided,

*As the term of service of the crews of these two vessels are about expiring. Unless the transfer is made regularly, it may lead to a confusion in the accounts what will not be easily remedied after Mr Bourne has left the country.*²⁰³

Chauncey told Washington that “the weakening the station so much in officers may lead to consequences fatal to the squadron” during the 1815 campaign.

In addition, Chauncey, Henry Eckford and the Brown brothers, Adam and Noah, were heavily involved in the largest shipbuilding effort so far at Sackets Harbor: the 106-gun ships of the line *New Orleans* and *Chippewa* and the 58-gun *Superior*-class frigate *Plattsburgh*. These new ships alone would require

*About thirty lieutenants, and five pursers, in addition to what was there on the first of December, and a proportionate number of other officers of all grades.*²⁰⁴

Finally, Chauncey was always short of money and what was provided by Washington was in the form of Treasury Notes, which were either not accepted by creditors in northern New York or accepted only at a discount of 10% or more.²⁰⁵

By late November 1814 Chauncey's financial situation was serious:

*We are now really in distress — the people who we owe for provisions have become extremely importunate — the discharged seamen are also clamorous — the officers are in much distress they have all large balances due them but cannot raise funds to pay their wash bills, besides they have been living on ship's fare for several weeks.*²⁰⁶

Chauncey needed \$100,000 immediately, half of that to pay the officers and men. Four days later his situation deteriorated. He was informed that two of his drafts (checks) for \$15,000, to pay for transporting stores to Sackets Harbor, had been “protested.” There was not enough money in the government’s accounts in the New York City banks to cover them and “the holders look to me for payment.”²⁰⁷ This was a very serious concern for Isaac Chauncey as the law at the time held him personally responsible for the debt. That same law allowed his creditors to have him thrown in debtors prison until the money was paid.

It got worse. When Chauncey travelled to New York City in December to arrange contracts for the new ships which the Navy Department insisted be built in time for the 1815 campaign he was informed that Henry Eckford and the Brown brothers demanded payment of the \$100,000 still owed them for their past work before they would agree to any new effort. Furthermore, they wanted that sum in “current money” and not in Treasury Notes. Chauncey knew that Treasury Notes were all that was available.²⁰⁸

By early 1815 it had gotten worse still. Now Chauncey needed an additional \$50,000 at Sackets Harbor for pay and provisions.²⁰⁹

At the end of January Chauncey provided new Navy Secretary Benjamin W. Crowninshield with a detailed list of the number of additional officers and men he would need to man the Lake Ontario squadron in 1815. After some allowance for re-enlistments but none for illness he would need 168 additional commissioned and warrant officers, 2,260 more seamen and boys and 470 more marines. Chauncey knew that “such a number of seamen cannot be recruited in time to answer our purpose” but that “unless very extraordinary exertions are used to obtain men the fleet of Ontario will be detained in port and not be in a situation to meet the enemy.”²¹⁰

Finally there were some of the usual complaints about seniority and promotions. On board the *Madison*, Midshipman William K. Latimer complained to Secretary Crowninshield that

*The numerous and repeated injuries I have experienced for the two last years of the five I have devoted to the naval service makes on my part forbearance no longer a virtue.*²¹¹

Latimer objected that Midshipman James McGowan, who had received his warrant in 1811, had been recently promoted to lieutenant while Latimer, a midshipman since 1809, was not.²¹²

Considering the increasing number and magnitude of his problems, the news of peace that reached Sackets Harbor about 18 February 1815 must have been warmly welcomed by Isaac Chauncey.

Post War

When word of peace arrived at Sackets Harbor, the *Madison* was still without a purser and, as March arrived, this lack was about to become serious as “the term of service of the crew of the *Madison* will expire in the course of this and the next month.” Chauncey asked that Purser Edward Fitzgerald be ordered back to Sackets Harbor to fill that post.²¹³

Money also remained a problem. Chauncey was ordered to send seamen to Boston, New York City and Baltimore but he lacked the funds, some \$50,000, to do so.²¹⁴ The funds


eventually arrived and the crews of all the ships in Chauncey's squadron began to leave Sackets Harbor for stations on the Atlantic.

Instead of returning to their original stations, many officers applied for furloughs or transfers. On board the *Madison* these included Midshipmen David Conyngham, who wanted a furlough to take a merchant voyage to India,²¹⁵ and Duncan N. Ingraham, who was furloughed to join his father on a voyage to Europe.²¹⁶ In late March the *Madison*'s surgeon, Bailey Washington, applied and was approved to join the navy's Mediterranean squadron.²¹⁷

By the end of March the terms of service of most of the *Madison*'s crew had expired. They were paid off and almost all left Sackets Harbor.²¹⁸ On 25 March 1815, the men who were left on board were ordered to Boston by way of Albany and New York City, under the command of Master Commandant David Deacon.²¹⁹

The following month, Edward Trenchard was ordered to turn over command of the *Madison* to Master Commandant Melancthon Woolsey. Woolsey's new command was purely administrative to allow Trenchard to be detached. Absent a crew, the *Madison* was now out of service and would remain so. Trenchard himself was given the option of returning to New York City or remaining at Sackets Harbor; he went to New York.²²⁰

On 1 July 1815, Isaac Chauncey formally relinquished command of the Sackets Harbor Naval Station to Master Commandant Melancthon Woolsey.²²¹ Woolsey was left with a small staff to maintain the decommissioned warships and to man the few remaining in service. The *Madison* herself was left at anchor inside the harbor.



Madison anchored in Sackets Harbor in 1816

NAC NMC-7637 (detail)

In May 1816 British intelligence correctly reported the state of the *Madison* as disarmed and laid up at Sackets Harbor. The report also gave her the ability to carry 25 guns, all 18-pound cannon with one gun presumably on a pivot mount. Her standard broadside was believed to be 234 pounds.²²²

In July 1816, Woolsey asked the Navy Commissioners for permission to cover the *Madison* with a board roof to preserve her from the elements. This was ordered

on 30 July but it did not prevent her slow decay. As the order also prohibited the *Madison*'s seams from being caulked until her services were required it was only a matter of time before she would sink to the bottom of the harbor.²²³ This order was repeated on 3 August, again stressing that the *Madison* was not to be caulked and ordering Woolsey to "observe all possible economy" while doing the work.²²⁴

In May 1817 the *Madison* was reported to be in good condition, covered with a board roof and moored at Navy Point inside the harbor.²²⁵ That same year the Rush-Bagot agreement between the United States and Great Britain severely restricted the number and size of armed vessels on the Great Lakes. It was now unlikely that the *Madison* would ever again be placed in service.

Money was still being spent to maintain the *Madison* as late as June 1817 when 354 pounds of 3-inch rope was purchased for her use.²²⁶

By 1821 the *Madison* was declared “unworthy of repair.”²²⁷ Two years later she was reported to Washington as being “sunk and decayed.”²²⁸ On 3 February 1824 the Navy Department recommended to Congress that all the warships at Sackets Harbor, except the two incomplete ships-of-the-line, should be sold.²²⁹ That November, the Board of Navy Commissioners informed Secretary of the Navy Samuel L. Southard that the *Madison* and the other warships in the harbor were

*Originally built of green timber and now so much decayed as to be deemed unworthy of repair. It is recommended to break them up or dispose of them, and to transport the stores at Sacketts harbour to New York, or sell them, as may be found most advantageous to the public interest.*²³⁰

On 3 March 1825 Congress passed a law authorizing the sale of these warships.²³¹

Three weeks later, Robert Hugunin of Oswego, New York, offered to buy the eight square-rigged vessels, including the *Madison*, for a total price of \$8,000, assuring the Navy Department that he would remove the vessels, except possibly the *Superior*, within eighteen months.²³² On 13 April the Navy Department accepted Hugunin’s offer, which may have been the only offer they received.²³³

The *Madison*’s standing rigging was sold separately at auction along with that of the frigate *Superior*’s on 1 August 1825 for \$660.00.²³⁴ Other parts of the *Madison*’s furniture and equipment were also sold on that date or at one of the two subsequent auctions also held at Sackets Harbor that fall.²³⁵ Those items, however, were included in lots from various sources and cannot be individually distinguished in the auction reports.

By the spring of 1827 the *Madison* had been raised and refitted by Robert Hugunin and Ogden Mallory.²³⁶ Renamed *General Brady*, after Brigadier General Hugh Brady, formerly commanding at Madison Barracks, the now 302-ton brig-rigged merchant vessel was relaunched at Sackets Harbor on 24 May 1827 accompanied by a cannon salute fired from Fort Pike at Madison Barracks and with General Brady himself on board.²³⁷

Three days earlier she had been registered at Sackets Harbor (#6) with Robert Hugunin as both owner and master.²³⁸ The *General Brady*’s first voyage was a trip from Sackets Harbor to Niagara that began on May 25, 1827.²³⁹ Her registration was renewed on 23 April 1828, the original listed as being lost. The *General Brady*’s registration was apparently surrendered on 14 April 1829.²⁴⁰

The previous November a local workman, Calvin Case, placed a lien against the brig (then owned by Robert and Hiram Hugunin) for \$219.43 for the labor and materials, including rigging, he spent working on her at the owner’s request during May 1828 and a separate lien for \$347 for similar work done in September 1828. After review by court-appointed referees, on 18 June 1829 the court awarded Case \$173.81 plus \$62.51 in

costs.²⁴¹ No further record of the *General Brady* has been found and her final fate is, at present, unknown, although she may have remained afloat into the 1830s.

Although nothing has yet been found in the contemporary record that explains why the former *Madison* had such a short and apparently unsuccessful career as a merchantman, some factors are clear. Even after being reduced from a ship to a brig rig and perhaps reduced somewhat in size, the *General Brady* would have been the largest merchant vessel on the lake. Even with one less mast, her square sails would have required a larger crew to handle than would a schooner rig. Finally most of the ports on Lake Ontario had sand bars at their mouth that prevented vessels of the size of the *General Brady* from entering. It is likely that for the 1820s she was just too large to be profitable.

On the other hand, two other former American warships, the *Oneida* and *Sylph*, both brigs, were refitted and served as merchantmen for another decade (the *Oneida* as the *Adjutant Clitz*) They were not taken out of service until at least the late 1830s. As those two vessels were not that much smaller, perhaps there was some other reason for the *General Brady*'s early demise.

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Reference Abbreviations

To shorten and simplify the source references that appear in the notes I have used a set of abbreviations. These are:

AF	NAUS, RG45, <i>Area File of the Naval Records Collection, Area 7.</i>
Articles of War	<i>Rules and Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy, 23 April 1800. Copy in Valle, James E., <i>Rocks and Shoals</i>, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980) Appendix B, p.285.</i>
ASP	<i>American State Papers, Class 6 - Naval Affairs, Volume 1.</i>
BECHS	Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society, Buffalo, New York.
CELSI	NAUS, RG77, <i>Letters From the Office of the Chief of Engineers Relating to Internal Improvements, 1824-1830.</i>
CELSM	NAUS, RG77, <i>Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Chief of Engineers.</i>
CLB	Isaac Chauncey's <i>Letterbooks</i> , Manuscript Department, New York Historical Society (#'s 1, 2, 5 & 6) & William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan (#'s 3, 4, & 7).
Crisman	Crisman, Kevin James, <i>The Jefferson: The History and Archaeology of an American Brig from the War of 1812</i> , Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1989.
DHC	Cruikshank, Ernest A., <i>Documentary History of the Campaigns on the Niagara Frontier</i> (Welland ON: Tribune Office).
Dudley	<i>Journal kept on board the U. S. S. Superior by Lieut. James A. Dudley U.S. Navy</i> , Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.
NAC	National Archives (Canada)
NAUK	National Archives (United Kingdom)
NAUS	National Archives (United States)
NCLRC	NAUS, RG45, Entry 220, <i>Navy Commissioners Letters Received from Commandants.</i>
PJM-PS	<i>Papers of James Madison, Presidential Series</i> , University of Virginia Press.
PRR	<i>Prize and Related Records of the War of 1812</i> , NAUS, RG21.
RAO	NAUS, RG217, <i>Records of the Accountant of the Navy and the Fourth Auditor of the Treasury.</i>
RG	Record Group
Service Records	Gibson, Gary M., <i>Service Records of U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Officers Stationed on Lake Ontario During the War of 1812</i> , Second Edition (Sackets Harbor, 2012).
Settled Accounts	NAUS, RG217, <i>Records of the Accounting Officers of the Treasury, Fourth Auditor Settled Accounts.</i>
SNLRC	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy From Captains ("Captain's Letters").</i>
SNLRD	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders.</i>

SNLRM	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy From Miscellaneous.</i>
SNLRO	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy From Officers Below the Rank of Commander.</i>
SNLSC	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Commandants and Navy Agents</i>
SNLSM	NAUS, RG45, <i>Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy.</i>
SNLSO	NAUS, RG45, <i>Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers.</i>
SNPLB	NAUS, RG45, <i>Secretary of the Navy's Private Letter Book</i> , microfilm publication T829 roll 453.
SWLRR	NAUS, RG107, <i>Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Registered Series</i>
Tompkins Papers	<i>Public Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, Military</i> , 3 volumes (Albany, 1898, 1902).
WLB	Melancthon Woolsey's <i>Letterbook #3</i> , <i>Woolsey Family Papers</i> , Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, MI.
Woolsey Journal 5	Melancthon Woolsey's <i>Journal #5</i> , <i>Woolsey Family Papers</i> , 52.MSS Box 95, WFP.2 JOU.1-5, Oneida County Historical Society, Utica NY.
Woolsey Journal 7	Melancthon Woolsey's <i>Journal #7b</i> (Jones 1814), <i>Woolsey Family Papers</i> , 52.MSS Box 95, WFP.2 JOU.1-5, Oneida County Historical Society, Utica NY.

¹ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 26 November 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 192, M125 roll 25.

² The raid on York, the attack on Fort George, three actions with the British on Lake Ontario during August and September 1813, and the action with the British troop convoy in October 1813.

³ Chauncey was born at Black Rock, Fairfield County, Connecticut on 20 February 1772.

⁴ Eckford received an advance payment of \$5,000 to begin his work at Sackets Harbor, Isaac Chauncey to Navy Agent John Bullus, 9 September 1812, CLB 3 p.15.

⁵ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 21 September 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 64, M125 roll 25; Isaac Chauncey to Charles Ludlow, 24 September 1812, CLB 3 p.25.

⁶ Lees, James, *The Masting and Rigging of English Ships of War 1625-1860*, 2nd Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984) p.199.

⁷ Isaac Chauncey to Charles Ludlow, 24 September 1812, CLB 3 p.25.

⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 8 October 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 106, M125 roll 25.

⁹ Isaac Chauncey to Charles Ludlow, 26 October 1812, CLB 3.

¹⁰ Tons burthen, later called "Builder's Old Measurement," applied the keel length and beam measurements to a formula which derived the approximate amount of cargo that the vessel could carry. This was not the same as the current tonnage figure which gives the weight of the water displaced by the vessel as it floats.

¹¹ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 5 and 26 November 1812 and 8 July 1813, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 items 163 and 192 and 1813 vol 4 item 170, M125 rolls 25 and 29. The two nine pound cannon were apparently never actually mounted but the gun ports were available in 1813.

¹² Silverstone, Paul H., *The Sailing Navy 1775-1854* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001) pp.32, 34.

¹³ Malcomson, Robert, *Warships of the Great Lakes 1754-1834* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001) p.60.

¹⁴ This is an estimate based on the ratio between deck and keel lengths of other similar sized warships in the 1800-1812 time period. Available records do not give a length on deck for the *Madison*. The actual deck length was certainly between 120 and 130 feet.

¹⁵ The 580 ton value given by Chauncey in his letter to Secretary Hamilton does not conform to the usual formula for tons burthen used in the United States: keel length times twice the beam divided by 190. That calculation yields a figure of about 612 tons. The British tonnage figures shown generally conform to the same formula but use a divisor of 188 as was standard in the Royal Navy. Steel, David, *The Shipwright's Vade-Mecum* (London, 1805) pp.249-251.

¹⁶ Most of the these specifications are taken from the contract signed between Melancthon Woolsey, Henry Eckford and Christian Bergh, 26 July 1808, NAUS, RG45, Accountant of the Navy, *Contracts*, Book 1, pp.348-352.

¹⁷ Malcomson, Robert, *Warships of the Great Lakes 1754-1834* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001) p.50.

¹⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 12 October 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 114, M125 roll 25.

¹⁹ On 26 November Chauncey reported that she "has been built in the short time of 45 days, nine weeks since the timber that she is composed of was growing in the Forrest," Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 2 November 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 192, M125 roll 25.

²⁰ Oswego NY, *Oswego Daily Palladium*, January 27, 1858.

²¹ The keel length times the square of the beam divided by 190, all measurements in feet.

²² *A Return of Vessels of War belonging to the United States upon Lake Ontario exhibiting their force in Guns and Men*, 10 June 1813, AF, M625 roll 76 frames 201-203.

²³ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 5 November 182, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 163, M125 roll 25.

²⁴ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 5 November 182, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 163, M125 roll 25.

²⁵ Service Records, pp.109-110 (Leonard), 81-82 (Fry).

²⁶ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 14 July 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 2 item 125, M125 roll 24; Paul Hamilton to Isaac Chauncey, 20 July 1812, SNLSC, M441 roll 1 frame 176.

²⁷ Voucher for the purchase of 60 barrels of salt from Christian Holmes on 10 October 1812 at a cost of \$183.60; NAUS. RG217, *Records of the Accounting Officers of the Treasury*, Fourth Auditor Settled Accounts, Alphabetic Series, Chauncey.

²⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 26 November 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 192, M125 roll 25.

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- ²⁹ Eckford also received an additional \$6,000 to pay for the modifications to the small schooners at Sackets Harbor and \$10,000 for material used to build warships on Lake Erie. Isaac Chauncey to John Bullus, 9 December 1812, CLB 3.
- ³⁰ Vouchers from Henry Eckford dated 26 June 1813, Chauncey Accounts.
- ³¹ In December 1812, many of Eckford's workmen started building the dispatch schooner *Lady of the Lake*.
- ³² Isaac Chauncey to John Bullus, 8 December 1812, CLB 3.
- ³³ Paper "A" attached to Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 8 December 1812, SNLRC, 1813 vol 8 item 31, M125 roll 33. Note the letter is filed in the archives with 1813s not 1812s letters.
- ³⁴ The total from Table 3 plus the sum known to be paid to Henry Eckford for post-launch work.
- ³⁵ *Statement of the cost of the United States Sloop of War Wasp...*, 10 August 1814, AF, M625 roll 77 frames 67-69.
- ³⁶ Some of the timber for the *Madison* was obtained without permission from land to the north of Sackets Harbor owned by Lemuel Storrs, Storrs to Elisha Camp, 29 September 1812; this practice continued and was discussed by Thomas L. Ogden in a letter to Elisha Camp on 24 March 1814 in which Ogden reports that "Commodore Chauncey when here informed me that Timber has been cut on our Lands under the authority of the Naval Officers without your permission"; both items are from the *Elisha Camp Papers*, Archives 696 box 1, Cornell University, Ithaca NY.
- ³⁷ Isaac Chauncey to Melancthon Woolsey, 9 December 1812, CLB 3.
- ³⁸ Isaac Chauncey to James T. Leonard, 10 December 1812, CLB 3.
- ³⁹ A 32-pound carronade weighed about 1,900 pounds (17 cwt).
- ⁴⁰ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 8 October 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 106, M125 roll 25.
- ⁴¹ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 5 November 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 163, M125 roll 25.
- ⁴² An extract of a letter from Sackets Harbor dated 29 November 1812, appearing in the Geneva NY *Geneva Gazette* on 30 December 1812 reported the *Madison* to be "pierced for 13 guns on a side, and 2 stern-chasers - 28 guns."
- ⁴³ "Extract of a letter from an officer in the navy to a gentleman in this city, dated Sacket's Harbor, Nov. 5", New York City, *The Columbian*, 23 November 1812.
- ⁴⁴ Isaac Chauncey to John Bullus, 29 November 1812, CLB 3.
- ⁴⁵ Testimony of Isaac Chauncey at Leonard's court martial, NAUS, RG45, *Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry*, vol 4 case 152, 1 December 1812, M273 roll 6.
- ⁴⁶ *A Return of Vessels of War belonging to the United States upon Lake Ontario exhibiting their force in Guns and Men*, 10 June 1813, AF, M625 roll 76 frames 201-203.
- ⁴⁷ Isaac Chauncey to Paul Hamilton, 1 December 1812, SNLRC, 1812 vol 3 item 200, M125 roll 25.
- ⁴⁸ Testimony of Isaac Chauncey at Leonard's court martial, NAUS, RG45, *Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry*, vol 4 case 152, 1 December 1812, M273 roll 6.
- ⁴⁹ Testimony of Isaac Chauncey at Leonard's court martial, NAUS, RG45, *Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry*, vol 4 case 152, 1 December 1812, M273 roll 6.
- ⁵⁰ Testimony of Isaac Chauncey at Leonard's court martial, NAUS, RG45, *Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry*, vol 4 case 152, 1 December 1812, M273 roll 6.
- ⁵¹ Isaac Chauncey to James T. Leonard, 13 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 2 item 176, M125 roll 27.
- ⁵² Most officers under arrest were restricted to the "limits of the village" a significantly smaller area than one four miles square.
- ⁵³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #3, 16 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 2, M125 roll 28.
- ⁵⁴ William Jones to Isaac Chauncey, 27 April 1813, SNLSO, vol 10 p.378, M149 roll 10.
- ⁵⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #17, 15 May 1813, NAUS, RG45, SNLRC 1813 vol 3 item 137, M125 roll 28.
- ⁵⁶ Isaac Chauncey to Samuel T. Anderson, 1 February 1812, SNLRC, 1813 vol 2 item 59, M125 roll 27.
- ⁵⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 5 February 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 1 item 50, M125 roll 26.
- ⁵⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Augustus H. M. Conkling, 26 January 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁵⁹ Service Records, pp.58-59 (Conkling).
- ⁶⁰ Isaac Chauncey to William Chauncey Wetmore, 1 February 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁶¹ Service Records, pp.176-177 (Wetmore).
- ⁶² Isaac Chauncey to Sylvester M. Kemper, 1 February 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁶³ Service Records, p.104.

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- ⁶⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Lowe and John Clark, 2 February 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁶⁵ Service Records, p.111-112.
- ⁶⁶ Service Records, p.55.
- ⁶⁷ Isaac Chauncey to Philip F. Livingston, 4 February 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁶⁸ Service Records, p.111.
- ⁶⁹ Isaac Chauncey to Richard Dodge, 23 January 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁷⁰ The schooners were the *Conquest*, *Growler*, *Pert*, *Fair American*, and *Julia*, General Orders, 1 February 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁷¹ Isaac Chauncey to John W. Wendell, 15 March 1813 and to Francis Gregory, 30 March 1813, CLB 3.
- ⁷² Service Records, p.176.
- ⁷³ Service Records, pp.86-88 (Gregory).
- ⁷⁴ Isaac Chauncey to Augustus H. M. Conkling, 8 April 1813, CLB 4.
- ⁷⁵ Isaac Chauncey to Philip F. Livingston, 8 April 1813, CLB 4.
- ⁷⁶ Vouchers from Samuel F. Hooker & Co. at Sackets Harbor dated 3 March and 20 April, 1813, Chauncey Accounts.
- ⁷⁷ Purchased from Esoch Arnold at Sackets Harbor on 23 February 1813 for \$1.00 (fife) and \$12.00 (drum), Chauncey Accounts.
- ⁷⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Commanders of Vessels, 9 April 1813, CLB 4.
- ⁷⁹ The anchors were each 25 cwt., Isaac Chauncey to John Bullus, 16 April 1813, CLB 4.
- ⁸⁰ Isaac Chauncey to Jesse Duncan Elliott, 17 April 1813, CLB 4.
- ⁸¹ Service Records, pp.70-72 (Elliott).
- ⁸² Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #4, 17 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 6, M125 roll 28.
- ⁸³ Isaac Chauncey to Henry Fry, Henry Fry to Isaac Chauncey and Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #5, all 18 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 items 9, 9a and 12, M125 roll 28.
- ⁸⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #8, 22 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 30, M125 roll 28.
- ⁸⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #11, 24 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 51, M125 roll 28.
- ⁸⁶ The United States had suffered successive major defeats at Fort Mackinac, Fort Dearborn, Detroit, Queenston Heights, the River Raisin and Ogdensburg. These were offset only by the capture of the undefended and derelict Fort Haldimand by a few members of the militia, raids by a detachment of the Rifle Regiment on the undefended Canadian villages of Gananoque and Brockville and militia Brigadier General Jacob Brown's repulse of a half-hearted and unauthorized British cross-river attack on Ogdensburg.
- ⁸⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #11, 24 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 51, M125 roll 28.
- ⁸⁸ Walter W. Buchanan to Samuel L. Southard, 27 November 1827, SNLRC, 1826 vol 1 item 40, M125 roll 99.
- ⁸⁹ Washington DC, *National Intelligencer*, 10 June 1813. The list of casualties was apparently taken from a report made by Chauncey to Navy Secretary Jones on 29 May 1813 but the original list has not yet been found.
- ⁹⁰ Walter W. Buchanan to Samuel L. Southard, 27 November 1827, SNLRC, 1826 vol 1 item 40, M125 roll 99.
- ⁹¹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #16, SNLRC, 11 May 1813, 1813 vol 3 item 136, M125 roll 28.
- ⁹² That February James Leonard wrote Secretary Jones regarding his brother Frederick: "I should feel the obligation very much if you would be pleased to order him to Sackets harbour." Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #23, 16 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 144, M125 roll 28; James T. Leonard to William Jones, 22 February and 3 June 1813, SNLRD, 1813 items 28 and 69, M147 roll 5.
- ⁹³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #16, #24, #25, #27 and #29, 11, 17, 19, 21 and 28 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 items 136, 148, 151, 164 and 190, M125 roll 28.
- ⁹⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #30, 29 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 196, M125 roll 28.
- ⁹⁵ William Bainbridge to William Jones, 27 April 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 60, M125 roll 28; Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 4 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 14, M125 roll 29.
- ⁹⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #29, 28 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 190, M125 roll 28.
- ⁹⁷ Washington DC, *National Intelligencer*, 10 June 1813; *Madison's Muster Roll*, T829 roll 16 pp.85-95. The *National Intelligencer* lists Wells as an ordinary seaman, the muster roll as a seaman when the roll was

completed the following July. Perhaps he was promoted after he recovered. The newspaper article was apparently based on a report from Chauncey to Secretary Jones but the original list has not yet been found. A letter to Jones on 28 May reports one killed and two wounded; the newspaper article lists only one killed and one (Wells) wounded. Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 28 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 190, M125 roll 28.

⁹⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #28, 27 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 187, M125 roll 28.

⁹⁹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #21, 15 May 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 3 item 141, M125 roll 28.

¹⁰⁰ For example, William Jones' congratulations appeared in his letter #21 to Isaac Chauncey on 31 May 1813, SNPLB, pp.26-28; the New York *Columbian* on 8 May 1813 referred to "Commodore Chauncey, the hero of the lakes;" the same day the New York *Statesman* told its readers that "The commodore is one of the best men in the world, and peculiarly suited to the command that has been confided to him."

¹⁰¹ William Jones to Isaac Chauncey #13, 8 April 1813, SNPLB, pp.5-9.

¹⁰² William Jones to Isaac Chauncey #13, 8 April 1813, SNPLB, pp.5-9.

¹⁰³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #30, 2 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 8, M125 roll 29.

¹⁰⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #31, 4 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 14, M125 roll 29.

¹⁰⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #38, 11 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 47, M125 roll 29.

¹⁰⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #31, 4 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 14, M125 roll 29.

¹⁰⁷ Service Records, pp.61-63 (Crane).

¹⁰⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #61, 10 July 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 182, M125 roll 29.

¹⁰⁹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #31, 4 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 14, M125 roll 29.

¹¹⁰ *A Return of Vessels of War belonging to the United States upon Lake Ontario exhibiting their force in Guns and Men*, AF, M625 roll 76 frames 201-203.

¹¹¹ "The new [British] Brig would be ready about the first of July." Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #49, 21 June 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 4 item 94, M125 roll 29.

¹¹² Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #63, 17 July 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 11, M125 roll 30.

¹¹³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #65, 19 July 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 20, M125 roll 30.

¹¹⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #66, 21 July 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 24, M125 roll 30.

¹¹⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 4 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 69, M125 roll 30.

¹¹⁶ Unknown Midshipman to J. Jones, 13 August 1813, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 70, M125 roll 35.

¹¹⁷ James Lucas Yeo to George Prevost, 9 August 1813, NAC, RG8, C.730, pp.78-80, roll C-3243.

¹¹⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 13 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 99, M125 roll 309.

¹¹⁹ Unknown Midshipman to J. Jones, 13 August 1813, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 70, M125 roll 35.

¹²⁰ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 13 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 99, M125 roll 309.

¹²¹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 13 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 99, M125 roll 309.

¹²² James Lucas Yeo to George Prevost, 11 August 1813, NAC, RG8, C.730 pp.81a-84, C3243.

¹²³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #73, 19 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 119, M125 roll 30.

¹²⁴ Woolsey Journal, entries for 23 and 27 August 1813.

¹²⁵ Woolsey Journal, entries for 2 and 8 September 1813.

¹²⁶ Woolsey Journal, entry for 2 September 1813.

¹²⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 13 September 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 42, M125 roll 31.

¹²⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, 13 September 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 42, M125 roll 31.

¹²⁹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #83, 13 September 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 42, M125 roll 31.

¹³⁰ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #84, 25 September 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 92, M125 roll 31.

¹³¹ Log of the *Madison*, 28 September 1813, portion printed in the New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, 15 October 1813.

¹³² Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #85, 1 October 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 115, M125 roll 31.

¹³³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #85, 1 October 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 115, M125 roll 31.

¹³⁴ Log of the *Madison*, 1 October 1813, portion printed in the New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, 15 October 1813.

¹³⁵ Log of the *Madison*, 4 October 1813, portion printed in the New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, 15 October 1813.

¹³⁶ Log of the *Madison*, 5 October 1813, portion printed in the New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, 15 October 1813.

¹³⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #91, 8 October 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 6 item 147, M125 roll 31.

- ¹³⁸ Unknown midshipman to "J. Jones," 6 October 1813, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 70, M125 roll 35.
- ¹³⁹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #97, 17 October 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 7 item 10, M125 roll 32.
- ¹⁴⁰ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #97, #99, #100 and #104, 17, 25 and 27 October and 1 November 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 7 items 10, 44, 54 and 70, M125 roll 32.
- ¹⁴¹ Currently Clayton, New York.
- ¹⁴² Now known as Cape Vincent.
- ¹⁴³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #106, 11 November 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 7 item 93, M125 roll 32.
- ¹⁴⁴ Woolsey Journal, entry for 14 November 1813.
- ¹⁴⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #111, 21 November 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 7 item 114, M125 roll 32.
- ¹⁴⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #114, 25 November 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 7 item 128, M125 roll 32.
- ¹⁴⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #138, 24 December 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 8 item 191, M125 roll 33.
- ¹⁴⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #127, 11 December 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 8 item 38, M125 roll 33.
- ¹⁴⁹ William M. Crane to William Jones, 26 November 1813, SNLRD, 1813 item 173, M147 roll 5. Crane's request involved 132 men less 20 which were "incapable of being removed from illness." It is not known if Crane obtained Chauncey's approval before he made his request to Jones.
- ¹⁵⁰ William M. Crane to William Jones, 13 February 1814, SNLRD, 1814 vol 1 item 52, M147 roll 5.
- ¹⁵¹ Vouchers submitted by Pardee & Conklin on 30 January and 28 February 1814, Chauncey Accounts.
- ¹⁵² Voucher submitted by Smith & Pardee, 8 December 1814, Chauncey Accounts.
- ¹⁵³ Unknown Midshipman to J. Jones, 21 December 1813, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 70, M125 roll 35.
- ¹⁵⁴ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #131, 19 December 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 8 item 72, M125 roll 33.
- ¹⁵⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #131, 19 December 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 8 item 72, M125 roll 33.
- ¹⁵⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #19, 15 March 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 47, M125 roll 35.
- ¹⁵⁷ Woolsey Journal, entry for 19 February 1814.
- ¹⁵⁸ Woolsey Journal, entry for 5 March 1814
- ¹⁵⁹ NAUS, RG45, *Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry*, vol 4 case 155, 21 January 1814, M273 roll 6.
- ¹⁶⁰ Thomas Johnson arrived on board the *Madison* on 10 July 1813 and was still on board at the end of April 1814. As his name was a common one, this was the last clear reference to him yet found, although he was probably included when the *Madison's* crew was transferred to the *General Pike* later that summer. NAUS, RG45, *Madison's Muster Roll and Crew List*, T829 roll 16 pp.64-73 and 117-125.
- ¹⁶¹ William M. Crane to Isaac Chauncey, 1 February 1814, SNLRD, 1814 vol 1 item 39, M147 roll 5.
- ¹⁶² *Madison's Pay Roll* dated 30 June 1814, NAUS, RG45, T829 roll 16 pp.155-172.
- ¹⁶³ Gordon Drummond to George Prevost, 24 March 1814, NAC, RG8, C.682, pp.244-245; Christie's deposition appears starting on p.246.
- ¹⁶⁴ William Jones to Isaac Chauncey, 15 January and 25 February 1814, SNPLB, pp.89-91 and 101; William Jones to William Bainbridge, 25 February 1814, SNPLB, pp.100-101; Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #8, 27 February 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 1 item 143, M125 roll 34.
- ¹⁶⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #19, 15 March 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 47, M125 roll 35; Jones notified Chauncey that the officers and men from the *Macedonian*, *Erie* and *Ontario* would be sent to him at Sackets Harbor, William Jones to Isaac Chauncey, 6 April 1814, SNPLB, p.120. The frigate *Congress* was later added to this list, John Smith to William Jones, 9 June 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 4 item 49, M125 roll 37.
- ¹⁶⁶ William Jones to Isaac Chauncey, 31 May 1814, SNPLB, p.146; John Smith to William Jones, 9 June 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 4 item 49, M125 roll 37.
- ¹⁶⁷ Statement of the American naval force on Lake Ontario, 24 June 1814, AF, M625 roll 77 frames 9-10.
- ¹⁶⁸ William Jones to Isaac Chauncey, 2 July 1814, SNPLB, p.163.
- ¹⁶⁹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #123, 8 July 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 4 item 160, M125 roll 37.
- ¹⁷⁰ Service Records, p.169-170.
- ¹⁷¹ Isaac Chauncey to Edward Trenchard, 22 August 1813, SNLRD, 1813 item 129, M147 roll 5; Isaac Chauncey privately to William Jones, 25 August 1813, SNLRC, 1813 vol 5 item 149, M125 roll 30.
- ¹⁷² Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #72, 15 May 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 3 item 67, M125 roll 36.

- ¹⁷³ Isaac Chauncey to Edward Trenchard, 9 July 1814, CLB 6.
- ¹⁷⁴ Tucker, Spencer, *Arming the Fleet* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989) p.125 with allowance made for a “lighter” 18 pound cannon.
- ¹⁷⁵ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #16, 11 March 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 2 item 33, M125 roll 35.
- ¹⁷⁶ *A view of the Force of the Squadron on Lake Ontario...*, 15 July 1814, AF, M625 roll 77 frames 25-27.
- ¹⁷⁷ *Exhibit of the U. S. Naval Forces on Lake Ontario shewing the names of the several Vessels, their force and condition*, December 1816, AF, M625 roll 78 frame 25; *Exhibit shewing the names, force and present state & condition of the Vessels of War of every description at Sackets Harbor*, 1 November 1818, AF, M625 roll 78 frames 65-66.
- ¹⁷⁸ Dudley, entry for 8 June 1814.
- ¹⁷⁹ Woolsey Journal, entries for 24 and 25 July 1814.
- ¹⁸⁰ Dudley, entry for 23 June 1814.
- ¹⁸¹ Dudley, entry for 29 June 1814.
- ¹⁸² The brig *Magnet* was the former schooner *Sir Sidney Smith* which had been rigged the previous winter. Chauncey mistakenly believed the *Magnet* was the former *Beresford*. That vessel, renamed *Netley*, was then anchored in the Niagara River along with the *Star* (former *Lord Melville*) and *Charwell* (former *Earl of Moira*).
- ¹⁸³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #132, 10 August 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 5 item 84, M125 roll 38.
- ¹⁸⁴ Isaac Chauncey to Walter Stewart, 9 February 1814, CLB 5.
- ¹⁸⁵ David Porter to Walter Stewart, 22 August 1814 and Walter Stewart to Isaac Chauncey, 23 August 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 4 item 12, M125 roll 37. Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #148, 4 September 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 6 item 14, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁸⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #142, 26 August 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 5 item 135, M125 roll 38.
- ¹⁸⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #151, 5 September 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 6 item 17, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁸⁸ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #142, 26 August 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 5 item 135, M125 roll 38.
- ¹⁸⁹ George Izard to Isaac Chauncey, 26 August 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 6 item 39, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁹⁰ Isaac Chauncey to George Izard, 11 September 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 6 item 39.
- ¹⁹¹ George Izard to Isaac Chauncey, 13 September 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 6 item 64, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁹² Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #155, SNLRC, 17 September 1814, 1814 vol 6 item 64, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁹³ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #155, SNLRC, 17 September 1814, 1814 vol 6 item 64, M125 roll 39.
- ¹⁹⁴ Woolsey Journal, entries for 19 to 23 September 1814.
- ¹⁹⁵ Robert M. Rose to Isaac Chauncey and Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #185, 27 October 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 7 item 66, M125 roll 40.
- ¹⁹⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #186, 27 October 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 7 item 67, M125 roll 40.
- ¹⁹⁷ Edward Trenchard to Isaac Chauncey, 25 October 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 7 item 67, M125 roll 40.
- ¹⁹⁸ William M. Caldwell to Benjamin Homans, 28 October 1814, SNLRO, 1814 vol 3 item 176, M148 roll 13.
- ¹⁹⁹ Edward Trenchard to John Porter and John Porter to William Jones, 13 November 1814, SNLRO, 1814 vol 4, item 25, M148 roll 13.
- ²⁰⁰ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #198, 23 November 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 8 item 31, M125 roll 41.
- ²⁰¹ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #198, 23 November 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 8 item 31, M125 roll 41.
- ²⁰² Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin Homans #1, 5 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 16, M125 roll 42.
- ²⁰³ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin Homans #1, 5 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 16, M125 roll 42.
- ²⁰⁴ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin Homans #1, 5 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 16, M125 roll 42.
- ²⁰⁵ These discounts presented problems both for the pursers and the officers paying bounty money (in Treasury Notes) to men recruited for service on the lakes. When it came time for their accounts to be settled in Washington, these men were found to have spent more in Treasury Notes than were covered by the vouchers and pay rolls they submitted. The difference was owed by them to the United States. In some cases private acts of Congress were required to authorize approval of the difference but these could take many years. For example, 30 June 1834’s *Act for the Relief of Wolcott Chauncey*, 23rd Congress, 1st Session, Chapter 179. In 1814 and 1815 Chauncey paid \$766.20 more in discounted Treasury Notes than were covered by his vouchers. The Treasury Department was ordered to settle his account “on the principles of equity and justice; and to allow, in the settlement thereof, whatever loss may have been sustained by him from the sale of treasury notes received by him.” Naval Storekeeper Samuel T. Anderson,

who was managing the transport of naval stores from New York City to Sackets Harbor in 1814 and 1815, had a similar problem. His account settlement produced a deficit of \$2,877.34 which was resolved by Congress in 1821. 16th Congress, 2nd Session, H.R.223. Army officers on recruiting duty were also involved and had to appeal to Congress for relief. One case was Adam Peck's who owed \$229.82 and his petition was considered by Congress in 1831. 21st Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rep.32.

²⁰⁶ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #199, 24 November 1814, SNLRC, 1814 vol 8 item 44, M125 roll 41.

²⁰⁷ Isaac Chauncey to William Jones #203, 28 November 1814, 1814 vol 7 item 72, M125 roll 40.

²⁰⁸ Isaac Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy #211, 10 December 1814, 1814 vol 8 item 99, M125 roll 41.

²⁰⁹ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield #5, 14 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 44, M125 roll 42. Chauncey received the money but in the usual Treasury Notes. Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield #11, 29 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 88, M125 roll 42.

²¹⁰ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield #13, 31 January 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 1 item 94, M125 roll 42.

²¹¹ William K. Latimer to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 1 February 1815, SNLRO, 1815 vol 1 item 78, M148 roll 14.

²¹² Unknown to Latimer at the time he made his complaint, the United States Senate would approve his promotion to lieutenant only three days later. Latimer would go on to have a long naval career, ending as a commodore.

²¹³ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield #40, 8 March 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 2 item 23, M125 roll 43.

²¹⁴ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield #41, 8 March 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 2 item 24, M125 roll 43.

²¹⁵ David Conyngham to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 5 March 1815, SNLRO, 1815 vol 2 item 21, M148 roll 14.

²¹⁶ Nathaniel Ingraham to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 1 March 1815, SNLRO, 1815 vol 2 item 3, M148 roll 14.

²¹⁷ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 22 March 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 2 item 88, M125 roll 43.

²¹⁸ Most of these men had started their service on board the frigate *Congress* in 1813 and by 1815 their two years was up. Records indicate that only a few re-enlisted at Sackets Harbor.

²¹⁹ Isaac Chauncey to David Deacon, 26 March 1815, CLB 7, p.39.

²²⁰ Isaac Chauncey to Edward Trenchard, 10 April 1815, CLB 7, p.61; Edward Trenchard to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 30 May 1815, SNLRD, 1815 item 108, M147 roll 6.

²²¹ Isaac Chauncey to Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 1 July 1815, SNLRC, 1815 vol 4 item 50, M125 roll 45.

²²² William Fitz William Owen to Gordon Drummond, 16 May 1816, NAC, RG8, C.674 pp.33-34, roll C-3171.

²²³ NAUS, RG45, Navy Commissioners, *Letters Sent*, John Rodgers to Melancthon Woolsey, 30 July 1816, T829 roll 288 p.142 referring to Woolsey's request of 19 July.

²²⁴ NAUS, RG45, Navy Commissioners, *Letters Sent*, John Rodgers to Melancthon Woolsey, 3 August 1816, T829 roll 288 p.144.

²²⁵ Melancthon Woolsey to John Rodgers, 24 May 1817, NAUS, RG45, Entry 220, *Letters to Navy Commissioners from Sackets Harbor*.

²²⁶ Purchased from Purser William M. Sands' private mercantile business on 10 June 1817 for \$77.88. Sands *Account Bill Book*, Archive #175, Jefferson County Historical Society, Watertown NY.

²²⁷ "Condition of the Navy and its Expenses", 25 January 1821, 16th Congress, 2nd Session, *American State Papers*, Class VI, *Naval Affairs*, vol 1 No. 196 p.712.

²²⁸ S.Doc 1, United States Senate, 18th Congress 1st Session, December 1, 1823.

²²⁹ S.Doc 30, United States Senate, 18th Congress 1st Session, February 3, 1824; S.Doc 1, United States Senate, 18th Congress 2nd Session, December 1, 1824.

²³⁰ John Rodgers to Samuel L. Southard, 20 November 1824, SNLRM, 1824 vol 6 item 127, M124 roll 100.

²³¹ *Public Statutes at Large of the USA*, Vol 4, 18th Congress 2nd Session, Chapter 101 (Boston: Little & Brown, 1846). S.Doc 2, United States Senate, 19th Congress 1st Session, December 2, 1825.

²³² Robert Hugunin to William Bainbridge, 23 March 1825, enclosed with a letter from Lieutenant Samuel W. Adams to Bainbridge, 28 March 1825, NAUS, RG45, Entry 220, *Letters to Navy Commissioners from Sackets Harbor*. Lt. Adams replaced Melancthon Woolsey as commandant at Sackets Harbor.

²³³ Samuel W. Adams to William Bainbridge, 9 May 1825, NAUS, RG45, Entry 220, *Letters to Navy Commissioners from Sackets Harbor*. Adams was acknowledging Bainbridge's letter of 13 April.

²³⁴ The purchaser was Jabez Foster & Co. Records of auction sales by Auctioneer Hiram Steele, 1 August 1825, NAUS, RG217, *4th Auditor Settled Accounts*, Alphabetic Series, Steele, box 2528.

²³⁵ Subsequent auctions were held at Sackets Harbor on 10 and 27 October 1825.; NAUS, RG217, *4th Auditor Settled Accounts*, Alphabetic Series, Steele, box 2528.

²³⁶ Calvin Case vs. The Brig *General Brady*, *Judgement Record*, filed 18 June 1829, Court of Common Pleas, Jefferson County, New York, document at Jefferson County Clerk's office, Watertown, NY.

²³⁷ Sackets Harbor NY, *Freeman's Advocate*, 31 May 1827. The article gave the *General Brady's* new tonnage as 350 instead of her registered tonnage of 302.

²³⁸ NAUS, RG41, *Records of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Certificates of Enrollment Issued at Sackets Harbor, New York*, microfilm at Penfield Library, SUNY/Oswego, Oswego NY.

²³⁹ *Freeman's Advocate*, Sacket's Harbor, May 31, 1827. The daughter of General Brady and his wife Sarah is buried in the Military Cemetery at Sackets Harbor, NY.

²⁴⁰ NAUS, RG41, *Records of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Certificates of Enrollment Issued at Sackets Harbor, New York*, microfilm at Penfield Library, SUNY/Oswego, Oswego NY.

²⁴¹ Calvin Case vs. The Brig *General Brady*, Court of Common Pleas, Jefferson County, New York, case papers from November 1828 to June 1829, documents at Jefferson County Clerk's office, Watertown, NY.